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Scout’s Honor: The Boy Scouts, Judicial Ethics, and 
the Appearance of Partiality 
 
In January 2015, the California Supreme Court officially 
adopted an amendment to its Code of Judicial Ethics with the 
express purpose of forbidding judges from remaining members of 
the Boy Scouts of America (BSA).1 Starting on January 21, 2016, 
judges in California will no longer be permitted to hold membership 
in the Boy Scouts of America2 or other youth organizations that limit 
membership on the basis of “race, sex, gender, religion, national 
origin, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.”3 Although California is the 
only state to take affirmative steps to ban membership in the Boy 
Scouts, forty-seven states have judicial codes of ethics that ban 
judges from membership in groups that practice invidious 
discrimination. Twenty-two of those states include in that bar groups 
that engage in “invidious discrimination” on the basis of sexual 
 
 1.  As will be discussed further, the proposed amendment expressly referenced the Boy 
Scouts as its intended target. SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CODE OF 
JUDICIAL ETHICS, INVITATION TO COMMENT: SP14-02, at 2, 4 (Feb. 5, 2014) [hereinafter 
INVITATION TO COMMENT], http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/SP14-02.pdf (“The Bar 
Association of San Francisco initiated the request, joined by the Santa Clara County Bar 
Association.”). Moreover, the amendment eliminated an exemption, which had been in place 
since 1996 allowing for membership in non-profit youth organizations without regard to their 
discriminatory practices. See infra Section I.A. 
 2.  The BSA recently changed its policies to allow individual scout troops to decide 
whether or not to allow gay scout leaders. As discussed infra in Section I.B, it is not clear 
whether the California ban will continue to apply to the BSA. However, in some ways, the 
changes in the BSA policy make the discussion of the constitutionality of California’s ban even 
more relevant. The policy change came as a result of continued legal challenges such as 
California’s pending ban. That unconstitutional efforts such as the judicial ban in California 
were successful in pressuring the BSA to change its policies means that such efforts deserve 
greater scrutiny. Because these efforts were successful in pressuring the BSA, there is reason to 
believe that they may be subsequently implemented against other unpopular groups 
and causes. 
 3.  Associated Press, California Bars Judges from Belonging to Boy Scouts, FOX NEWS 
(Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/01/24/california-bars-judges-from-
boy-scouts/; Mark Pulliam, Blacklisting the Boy Scouts, CITY J. (Feb. 6, 2015), 
http://www.city-journal.org/2015/cjc0206mp.html. See generally INVITATION TO 
COMMENT, supra note 1. 
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orientation.4 Such canons raise significant constitutional concerns 
which have received surprisingly little scholarly attention.5 
This Comment will consider the constitutionality of California’s 
new ban on judicial participation in the Boy Scouts (“Boy Scout 
ban”). Because most states, including California, model their judicial 
codes of ethics after the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, these 
observations will apply with equal force to other states that have bans 
on judicial membership in groups that engage in discrimination that 
is deemed invidious. Part I will examine the text and history of the 
California Judicial Code of Ethics to show that the State has 
deliberately targeted the Scouts and other expressive associations. 
Part II will examine the wide range of constitutional rights that are 
substantially burdened by the canon, including freedom of 
association, free exercise, and parental autonomy. As a result, the 
proper standard of review is strict scrutiny, even though judges are 
public officials, and the State must justify the restriction by pointing 
 
 4.  It is unclear whether the policies in these states would ban membership in the 
Scouts. As will be discussed in Section I.A, the commentary to the California rule explains that 
determining whether a group practices invidious discrimination is a fact-specific, case-by-case 
inquiry. California, however, in its request for comment regarding the elimination of the 
exemption for youth organizations, expressly stated that this change would impact the Boy 
Scouts. See INVITATION TO COMMENT, supra note 1, at 4. 
 5.  Sean Grindlay wrote an invaluable article regarding the change in the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct to include sexual orientation. Since his article was published in 2007, there 
has been a sea change in the way that society views sexual orientation discrimination, as well as 
significant developments in the campaign finance realm, which I rely on heavily in this article. 
In addition, Grindlay’s article did not examine other rights that the canon might burden, such 
as free exercise or parental rights, nor did he closely examine whether avoiding an appearance 
of impartiality could ever constitute a compelling state interest. See generally Sean V. Grindlay, 
May a Judge Be a Scoutmaster? Dale, White, and the New Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 5 
AVE MARIA L. REV. 555 (2007). Harvard Professor Noah Feldman has also been a prominent 
public voice on the topic and has been interviewed in scores of articles relating to the Scout 
ban. I am grateful to Professor Feldman for his extensive contribution to the public discourse 
over that ban. See Emily Green, California Judges Must Cut Ties with the Boy Scouts, NPR 
(Mar. 186, 2015, 2:52 PM ET), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/16/392360308/california-
judges-must-cut-ties-with-the-boy-scouts; Noah Feldman, Why Can’t California Judges Join 
the Boy Scouts?, TAMPA TRIB. (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.tbo.com/list/news-opinion-
commentary/why-cant-california-judges-join-the-boy-scouts-20150131/; John Blosser, 
Orwellian: California Bars Judges from Joining Boy Scouts, NEWSMAX (Mar. 18, 2015, 6:43 
PM), http://www.newsmax.com/US/Boy-Scouts-judges-California/2015/03/18/ 
id/631012/. 
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to a compelling interest and employ the least restrictive means of 
achieving that interest.6 
To justify its restriction, the California Supreme Court opines 
that membership in a group such as the Boy Scouts, which in the 
Court’s view engages in invidious discrimination, creates an 
appearance of partiality and bias.7 It suggests that gays and lesbians 
standing before a judge who is a member of the Scouts will have 
reason to believe the judge cannot fairly administer justice, and that 
the general public will lose confidence in the integrity and objectivity 
of the judiciary.8 
However, as Part III will show, avoiding a generalized 
appearance of impropriety cannot be a compelling governmental 
interest: Specifically, drawing on recent Supreme Court cases in the 
realm of campaign finance, Part III will argue that avoiding a 
generalized appearance bias (as opposed to the appearance of specific 
bias against an actual party before the court) does not rise to the 
level of a compelling interest.9 Moreover, Part IV will argue that the 
California policy is poorly tailored to achieve the State’s interest 
because it is both grossly over- and underinclusive, and relies on a 
cynical view of the judiciary which undermines the State’s purported 
interest in public confidence in the system. Additionally, a wide 
variety of less restrictive alternatives exist. 
As a result of these deficiencies, California’s Scout ban is 
unconstitutional and should be vigorously challenged 
and overturned. 
I. THE CALIFORNIA RULE DELIBERATELY TARGETS EXPRESSIVE 
ASSOCIATIONS SUCH AS THE BOY SCOUTS 
Although seemingly a modest change, the new amendment to 
the California Code of Judicial Ethics represents a sweeping view 
that the State has a sufficiently compelling interest to ban judicial 
membership in any organization (even an expressive association) on 
the basis of discriminatory policies. 
 
 6.  See infra Section II.D. 
 7.  See INVITATION TO COMMENT, supra note 1, at 4. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See infra Section III.A. 
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A. The History and Text of the Ban Show that It Was Intended to 
Target Expressive Associations Such as the Boy Scouts 
California’s Judicial Canon 4 speaks to extrajudicial activities of 
judges. Canon 4(c) states that as a general principle, “a judge may 
serve as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor of an 
educational, religious, charitable, service, or civic organization not 
conducted for profit.”10 Indeed, the commentary to Canon 4A 
emphasizes that “[c]omplete separation of a judge from extrajudicial 
activities is neither possible nor wise; a judge should not become 
isolated from the community in which he or she lives.”11 Yet Canon 
4A emphasizes that judges should not engage in extra-judicial 
activities that “(1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to 
act impartially, (2) demean the judicial office, (3) interfere with the 
proper performance of judicial duties, or (4) lead to frequent 
disqualification of the judge.”12 The commentary emphasizes that 
“[e]xpressions of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the 
judge’s judicial activities, may cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s 
capacity to act impartially as a judge.”13 
Judicial Canon 2 prohibits judges from engaging in particular 
activities that create impropriety or the appearance of impropriety.14 
It is modeled after the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which in 
2007 added a prohibition on membership in groups that 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.15 Canon 2(c) bars 
judicial “membership in any organization that practices invidious 
 
 10.  CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 4C(3)(b) (2015), 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/ documents/ca_code_judicial_ethics.pdf. 
 11.  Id. Canon 4A cmt. 
 12.  Id. Canon 4A. 
 13.  Id. Canon 4A cmt. 
 14.  Id. Canon 2. 
 15.  See ABA JOINT COMM’N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT, REPORT 6 (Nov. 2006), http://www.bjs.state.mn.us/file/code-of-judicial-
conduct/aba-joint-comm-report-nov-2006.pdf. There is reason to believe that this change was 
in part intended to specifically impact membership in the Boy Scouts. The ABA filed an amicus 
brief in the Boy Scouts v. Dale case arguing against allowing the Boy Scouts to continue to 
exclude gay members and has been very active in its opposition to the Scouts. See Grindlay, 
supra note 5, at 563. For more on the history of the ban on membership in organizations that 
practice invidious discrimination, see Natasha A. Phillips, The Belle Meade Example: 
Enforcement of Canon 2C Under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 733, 735 (2012). 
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discrimination on the basis of race, sex, gender, religion, national 
origin, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.”16 The advisory committee 
notes explain that this prohibition is necessary “to preserve the 
fairness, impartiality, independence, and honor of the judiciary, to 
treat all parties equally under the law, and to avoid impropriety and 
the appearance of impropriety.” The canon once contained an 
exemption for “an official military organization of the United 
States,” and “a nonprofit youth organization.”17 The Canon still 
retains an exemption for “membership in a religious organization.”18 
And the prior commentary justified the exemption for membership 
in youth organizations on the ground that such an exemption was 
necessary “to accommodate individual rights of intimate association 
and free expression.”19 For reasons discussed in Part II, such an 
accommodation was and remains necessary under the reasoning of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Boy Scouts v. Dale. 
With regards to determining “[w]hether an organization 
practices invidious discrimination,” the most recent commentary 
notes that this “is often a complex question to which judges should 
be sensitive,” and if a group is “dedicated to the preservation of 
religious, ethnic, or cultural values of legitimate common interest to 
its members” or is an “an intimate, purely private organization,” the 
canon may not apply.20 However, that commentary also makes clear 
that other organizations that “arbitrarily exclude[] from 
membership” on the basis of one of the aforementioned 
classifications can be said to discriminate invidiously.21 In addition, 
the comment suggests that membership in any organization that 
engages in illegal discriminatory practices is also forbidden even if 
the exclusion is not based on a specified protected class such as race, 
gender, or sexual orientation.22 According to the comment, any 
“public manifestation” of a “knowing approval of invidious 
 
 16.  CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 2 (2015), http://www.courts.ca.gov/ 
documents/ca_code_judicial_ethics.pdf. 
 17.  Id. The military organization exception was once necessary because of policies such 
as Don’t Ask Don’t Tell. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. Canon 2 cmt. 
 20.  Id. 
  21.  See id. 
 22.  Id. 
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discrimination” “gives the appearance of impropriety . . . and 
diminishes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of 
the judiciary.”23 
While the reference to groups “dedicated to the preservation of 
religious, ethnic, or cultural values” might at first glance seem to 
refer to expressive associations such as the Boy Scouts, it is clear that 
the change is intended expressly to foreclose membership in the Boy 
Scouts: The invitation to comment expressly stated that eliminating 
the exception would have the effect of “prohibiting judges from 
being members of or playing a leadership role in the BSA.”24 Public 
comments on the change overwhelmingly focused on the Boy Scouts 
and the impact this change would have on judicial Boy Scout 
membership.25 Indeed, several of those commenting on the proposed 
changes expressed concern that the BSA was singled out for 
attention while other youth groups that might have selective 
membership policies such as the Girl Scouts were ignored.26 Thus, it 
seems clear that the California change was expressly meant to apply 
to the Boy Scouts. 
Moreover, by deleting the sentence in the commentary to Canon 
2C regarding the need “to accommodate individual rights of 
intimate association and free expression,” the California Supreme 
Court Advisory Committee on the Code of Judicial Ethics made it 
clear that “the code prohibits judges from being associated with any 
organization if that association would affect the integrity or 
impartiality of the judiciary.”27 In so stating, the advisory committee 
is implying that the State’s interest in “public confidence in the 
impartiality of the judiciary” trumps or outweighs the right to 
belong to even an organization such as the Boy Scouts, which has 
been designated as an expressive association by the Supreme Court.28 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  INVITATION TO COMMENT, supra note 1. 
 25.  SP14-02: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CANON 2C OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ETHICS [hereinafter AMENDMENT COMMENTARY], http://www.dailyjournal.com/ 
DJEditorialAttachment/ SP14-02_Chart_05_08_14_Final_w_attachments.pdf. 
 26.  See id. cmt. 43 at 295–302 (Jeffrey S. Bostwick, Comment on  SP14-02: 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CANON 2C OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS); see also id. cmt. 
354 at 350–52 (Life Legal Defense Fund, Comment on SP14-02: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
TO CANON 2C OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS). 
 27.  INVITATION TO COMMENT, supra note 1. 
 28.  See infra Section II.A. 
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Therefore, even though the amendment at first glance seems limited 
to the Boy Scouts and perhaps a narrow range of other youth 
organizations, it actually represents a sweeping assertion by the State 
that it can bar membership in any organization (except perhaps a 
religious organization) on the basis of discriminatory policies.29 
Although California is the only state to eliminate an existing 
exemption, the code of conduct of many other states would also 
arguably prohibit a judge from membership in the Boy Scouts and 
other expressive associations. Indeed, the codes of other states are 
perhaps even more explicit on this point. For instance, commentary 
to the Massachusetts Code of Judicial Conduct is almost identical to 
California’s, with this addition: “The purpose of this Rule is to 
prohibit judges from joining organizations practicing invidious 
discrimination, whether or not their an organization’s membership 
practices are constitutionally protected.”30 Some states likewise lack 
even an express exemption for membership in religious 
organizations.31 Thus, it seems clear that several states either believe 
that restricting judicial membership in groups such as the Boy Scouts 
does not generate serious constitutional problems or that they have a 
sufficiently compelling interest to restrict judicial membership. Thus, 
although California is the only state to expressly focus on the Boy 
Scouts, it is likely that as discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation becomes more and more strongly prohibited throughout 
the country, more states will make express efforts to prohibit judicial 
membership in the Boy Scouts and other groups with traditional 
moral views about homosexuality. Unfortunately, as the next part 
 
 29.  This is in contrast to the approach taken in New York, where there is an express 
exemption for “membership in an organization that is dedicated to the preservation of 
religious, ethnic, cultural or other values of legitimate common interest to its members.” N.Y. 
RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE § 100.2 (2010), http://www.nycourts.gov/rules/ 
chiefadmin/100.shtml. While the California rules suggest that such an organization might not 
be considered one that engages in invidious discrimination, there is no express exemption. 
 30.  MASS. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT r. 3:09: CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT  Canon 3 
r. 3.6 cmt. [2] (2016), http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-res/rules-of-court/sjc/ 
sjc309.html. 
 31.  See CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 r. 3.6 (2011), 
https://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/PracticeBook/Judicial_Conduct.pdf. There is no 
reason to believe that judicial membership in a religious organization would not be protected 
in Connecticut—indeed, as I argue in Part II, such an exemption would be constitutionally 
required. Nevertheless, the absence of an express exemption is notable. 
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will show, these efforts trample on a wide range of 
constitutional rights. 
B. Even Though the Boy Scouts Recently Changed Their Policy with 
Regard to Gay Scoutmasters, It Is Likely that Membership in Scouting 
Could Still Be Barred 
On July 27, 2015, the Boy Scouts of America voted to officially 
change its controversial policy regarding gay Scoutmasters.32 This 
change came in response to legal pressures faced by the Boy Scouts.33 
The newly ratified policy lifts the national ban on gay Scout leaders 
but allows individual troops the freedom to set their own policies 
with regard to the selection of Scoutmasters. This change was met 
with criticism from long-term supporters of Scouting, such as the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,34 and led other churches 
to abandon the BSA and join Trail Life USA, a more 
conservative alternative.35 
Nevertheless, it is possible that judicial membership in the Boy 
Scouts will continue to be foreclosed as a result of the discretion 
given to local chapters and affiliates to exclude gay Scout leaders. 
Gay rights organizations lambasted the changes as “half steps”36 and 
 
 32.  Todd Leopold, Boy Scouts Change Policy on Gay Leaders, CNN (July 28, 2015, 9:16 
AM ET), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/27/us/boy-scouts-gay-leaders-feat/. 
 33.  Robert M. Gates, National Annual Meeting Remarks, OFFICIAL NEWSROOM BSA 
(May 21, 2015), http://scoutingnewsroom.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/DR-
GATES-REMARKS.pdf. The California ban was expressly mentioned in a memo from the Boy 
Scouts legal counsel at Hughes Hubbard regarding the legal impacts of the new policy. 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, Effect of Changes in Adult Leader Standard on Religious 
Chartered Organizations, OFFICIAL NEWSROOM BSA, http://scoutingnewsroom.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/Religious-Organization-Protections-Memo-062915.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2015). 
 34.  The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Church Re-Evaluating Scouting 
Program, MORMON NEWSROOM (July 27, 2015), http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/ 
article/church-re-evaluating-scouting-program; see also The Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, 
LCMS Statement on Boy Scouts of America Policy Change, PRESSROOM (July 28, 2015, 
10:42:32), http://blogs.lcms.org/2015/lcms-statement-on-boy-scouts-of-america-
policy-change. 
 35.  Greg Garrison, After Boy Scouts Welcome Gays, Some Churches Start Alternative 
Group, AL.COM (Aug. 5, 2015, 10:44 AM), http://www.al.com/living/index.ssf/2015/08/ 
after_boy_scouts_welcome_gays.html. 
 36.  Liz Halloran, HRC to Boy Scouts of America: You Can’t End Discriminatory Ban 
with Half Steps, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN: BLOG (July 13, 2015), http://www.hrc.org/blog/ 
entry/hrc-to-boy-scouts-of-america-you-cant-end-discriminatory-ban-with-half-step. 
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a “monumental step back,”37 suggesting that the Scouts will face 
continued social and legal pressure.38 At least one court has found 
that the relationship between the Scouts and its affiliates might be 
described as a principal-agent relationship, which suggests that the 
Boy Scouts could be held liable for the conduct of its affiliates.39 
In November 2015, the California Committee on Judicial Ethics 
Opinions provided an oral advice summary for California judges. 
Rather than providing uniform advice as to whether the ban would 
bar judicial membership in religious Scout troops, the summary 
noted that each “judge must investigate his troop’s policies, 
practices, and values of common interest to the troop members.”40 
This advisory opinion suggests that judges have some discretion in 
choosing whether to belong to Scout troops but does not foreclose 
the possibility that the ban will be enforced against members of 
the judiciary. 
This article will proceed based on the assumption that the 
California ban and other similar bans will continue to impact the Boy 
Scouts. If, however, that is not the case, the arguments are still 
applicable to other organizations, such as Trail Life USA, which were 
started as a conservative alternative to the Boy Scouts and retain the 
 
 37.  Dashanne Stokes, Op-Ed: Why the Boy Scouts’ New Policy Still Discriminates, 
ADVOCATE (July 20, 2015, 3:00 AM EDT), http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2015/ 
07/20/op-ed-why-boy-scouts-new-policy-still-discriminates. 
 38.  In light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision that sexual orientation discrimination is 
subject to heightened scrutiny, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 483 
(9th Cir. 2014), and the EEOC decision that sexual orientation discrimination is equal to sex 
discrimination, it is highly likely that a policy that allows a large number of scouting troops to 
exclude gay Scoutmasters will be considered invidious discrimination, at least in California. 
Allen Smith, EEOC: Sexual Orientation Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination, SOC’Y FOR 
HUM. RES. MGMT. (July 20, 2015), http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/federalresources/ 
pages/eeoc-ruling-sexual-orientation.aspx. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decision in Boy 
Scouts v. Dale relied on the fact that exclusion of homosexuals was essential to the Boy Scouts’ 
mission and purpose, and the Court’s Dale ruling may, therefore, not continue to shield the 
Boy Scouts after the change, opening them up for further litigation. 
 39.  Mayfield v. Boy Scouts of Am., 95 Ohio App. 3d 655 (1994). This argument has 
been raised unsuccessfully in other instances. See Randall v. Orange Cty. Council, 952 P.2d 
261, 263 (Cal. 1998) (local Cub Scouts allegedly discriminated and plaintiffs also sued the 
Scout council); Vargas-Santana v. Boy Scouts of Am., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24004 (D.P.R. 
Mar. 30, 2007) (local church troop allegedly discriminated and plaintiffs also sued the BSA). 
 40.  Calif. Supreme Court Comm. on Judicial Ethics Ops., Oral Advice Summary No. 
2015-014 4 (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.judicialethicsopinions.ca.gov/sites/default/files/ 
CJEO%20Oral%20Advice%20Summary%202015-014.pdf (discussing judicial membership in 
church-sponsored BSA troops). 
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policies that were traditionally embraced by the Boy Scouts.41 And, 
regardless of its impact on particular groups, the declaration that 
judicial ethics trumps even the freedom of association of expressive 
associations is deeply problematic and violates a wide variety of 
constitutional rights. 
II. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ARE ADVERSELY IMPACTED BY THE 
SCOUT BAN IN WAYS THAT REQUIRE STRICT SCRUTINY 
This section will consider the constitutional rights implicated by 
the Boy Scout ban.42 First, the ban most directly burdens freedom of 
expressive association. Second, the ban burdens the rights of free 
exercise of religion because participation in Scouting is a major part 
of the religious tradition of many judges. Third, the ban also 
burdens the parental right to direct the upbringing of children. And 
in each case, the ban burdens these rights in a way that calls for 
strict scrutiny. 
A. The Scout Ban Burdens Freedom of Expressive Association 
The California canon burdens freedom of association by 
preventing judges from participating in expressive organizations such 
 
 41.  Fred Lucas, Bible-Based Alternative to Boy Scouts Launches After Policy Change for 
Gay Scouts, BLAZE (Jan. 2, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/01/ 
02/bible-based-alternative-to-boy-scouts-launches-after-policy-change-for-gay-scouts/. 
 42.  In addition to the rights that will be discussed, there are more arguments that could 
be made that will not receive expanded attention here. An argument can be made, for example, 
that the State’s action constitutes a Religious Test Oath or a Bill of Attainder. These arguments 
are, in my judgment, less plausible than the ones I have chosen to focus on and so they will 
only be described here in brief: First, the ban could constitute a Religious Test Oath because it 
creates a job condition which “dampen[s] the exercise generally of First Amendment rights.” 
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 358 n.11 (1976); see also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 
(1961). The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that the notion that a judge would be required 
to recuse himself from certain matters as a result of religious beliefs “stands in conflict with the 
principle embedded in Article VI.” Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399, 
400 (9th Cir. 1995). If a recusal requirement violates Article VI, then surely a complete bar on 
judicial service raises even more serious Article VI concerns. Second, the ban is arguably a Bill 
of Attainder because it serves as “legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically 
designated persons or groups.” United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965). Although 
the rule was ratified by the California Supreme Court rather than a traditional legislator, it is 
likely that the Court is acting in a quasi-legislative function. Of course, this argument is 
weakened by the fact that removal from office for being a Scout is not retroactive and is not 
automatic. A judge would thus be given a hearing before being removed from office. 
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as the Boy Scouts. The Supreme Court has long held that freedom 
of association is at the core of First Amendment freedoms. In 
NAACP v. Alabama, the Court held that requiring the NAACP to 
disclose its membership would violate each individual member’s 
right to freely associate with groups of his or her choosing.43 The 
Court recognized that “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and 
private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably 
enhanced by group association” and that “state action which may 
have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the 
closest scrutiny.”44 The Court also explained that any measure which 
“would have the practical effect ‘of discouraging’ the exercise of 
constitutionally protected political rights” would be subject to strict 
scrutiny even if the statute did not facially seem to 
target association.45 
Of course, this right to freedom of association is not absolute, 
and the Supreme Court has found, at times, that a state has a 
sufficiently compelling interest to overcome the individual’s interest 
in free association. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court 
found that a public accommodations law that required the Jaycees to 
accept female members was constitutional.46 The Court made it clear 
that the right to freedom of association was “plainly implicated” and 
that “[t]here can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the 
internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that 
forces the group to accept members it does not desire.”47 However, 
the Court concluded that the “compelling interest in eradicating 
discrimination . . . justifies the impact that the application of the 
statute . . . may have on the . . . members’ associational freedoms.”48 
Because discrimination “deprives persons of their individual dignity 
and denies society the benefits of wide participation in political, 
economic, and cultural life,” the State clearly had a compelling 
 
 43.  Interestingly, the Court chose to focus on the rights of members and allowed the 
NAACP to litigate on behalf of its membership rather than consider whether the group itself 
had a right to be free from scrutiny into its membership. NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 
U.S. 449, 458 (1958). 
 44.  Id. at 460. 
 45.  Id. at 461. 
 46.  468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 47.  Id. at 622–23. 
 48.  Id. at 623. 
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interest.49 The Court also noted that the State’s interest was 
“unrelated to the suppression of ideas.”50 The Court concluded that 
this was “the least restrictive means” because it did not impose “any 
serious burden on the . . . members’ freedom of expressive 
association.”51 Because there was no evidence that including women 
as full members would “impede the organization’s ability to engage 
in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views,” 
the law burdened expressive activity “no greater than is necessary.”52 
Sixteen years later, the Court reached a drastically different 
outcome when considering whether a New Jersey anti-discrimination 
ordinance would unduly burden the Boy Scouts’ freedom of 
association rights by restricting its ability to exclude gay officers.53 In 
Boy Scouts v. Dale, the Court ultimately concluded that the ordinance 
violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of 
expressive association.54 
In doing so, the Court first considered whether the Boy Scouts 
was a group that engaged in “some form of expression.” Because the 
organization sought to transmit a system of values to youth, it 
qualified as an expressive association.55 The Court next concluded 
that because “homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values 
embodied in the Scout Oath and Law,” the anti-discrimination 
 
 49.  Id. at 625. 
 50.  Id. at 624. 
 51.  Id. at 626. 
 52.  Id. at 628. 
 53.  Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 641 (2000). For background on the 
Dale cases, see Dennis Amari, Boy Scouts May Discriminate Against Homosexuals on the Basis of 
the First Amendment Right of Expressive Association: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 
640 (2000), 9 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 451, 460 (2001). For an overview of the 
question of whether a group like the Boy Scouts constitutes a public accommodation for anti-
discrimination laws, see William F. Grady, The Boy Scouts of America As a “Place of Public 
Accommodation”: Developments in State Law, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 517, 524 (1999) (discussing 
the evolution of the question of whether a group like the Scouts is a public accommodation). 
 54. See generally David McGowan, Making Sense of Dale, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 121, 
124 (2001) (suggesting a variety of ways to reconcile Dale and freedom of association 
decisions that predate it); see also Fredrick W. Quast, Does Morally Straight Mean Only Straight 
Is Moral?: The First Amendment Versus Public Accommodation Laws in Boy Scouts of America 
v. Dale, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 507, 530 (2001) (arguing that the Court struck the proper 
balance in Dale regarding expressive association rights). 
 55.  Dale, 530 U.S. at 650–51. But see Mark Hager, Freedom of Solidarity: Why the Boy 
Scout Case Was Rightly (but Wrongly) Decided, 35 CONN. L. REV. 129, 130 (2002) (arguing 
that all membership decisions are inherently expressive). 
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ordinance would limit the group’s “ability to advocate public or 
private viewpoints.”56 Although the dissent argued that including gay 
individuals was not truly antithetical to the Scout’s mission,57 the 
Court gave substantial deference to the group’s stated values and 
beliefs, explaining that “it is not the role of the courts to reject a 
group’s expressed values because they disagree with those values or 
find them internally inconsistent.”58 The Court also explained that it 
“must also give deference to an association’s view of what would 
impair its expression.”59 Nor must a group “trumpet its views from 
the housetops” in order to receive “First Amendment protection.”60 
Moreover, because the ban directly restricted associational rights, 
strict scrutiny was the proper standard of review. Examining the 
State’s purported interest in requiring the Scouts to include gay 
members, the Court made it clear that “public or judicial disapproval 
of a tenet of an organization’s expression does not justify the State’s 
 
 56.  Professor Garnett has urged the Supreme Court to reconsider the Jaycees opinion in 
light of Dale. Richard W. Garnett, Jaycees Reconsidered: Judge Richard S. Arnold and the 
Freedom of Association, 58 ARK. L. REV. 587 (2005). He persuasively argues that membership 
in and of itself should raise First Amendment concerns even if the group does not express a 
position on a particular issue of public concern. Id. Were the Court to reevaluate the Jaycees 
opinion, it would only further strengthen the arguments advanced regarding the judicial Scout 
ban. See id. at 601 (“The conduct at issue—i.e., discrimination in membership and 
leadership—is of First Amendment concern not simply because it is freighted with or 
motivated by ideas, but because it goes to the structure and identity of the association as 
an association.”). 
 57.  Dale, 530 U.S. at 666 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 58.  Id. at 651 (majority opinion). 
 59.  Id. at 653. But see N. Nicole Endejann, Coming Out Is a Free Pass Out: Boy Scouts 
of America v. Dale, 34 AKRON L. REV. 893, 909 (2001) (criticizing Dale on the basis that it 
failed to require the group to prove that its identity would truly be compromised). 
 60.  Dale, 530 U.S. at 656; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries: 
Speech, Association, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 641, 650 (2001) (“But expression worthy of 
First Amendment protection need not be explicit or broadcast to the public at large, and a 
threat to associational activity built around such expression need not be particularly 
dramatic.”). But some have suggested that it is precisely the fact that a group must be open 
about its discriminatory practices to qualify for protection under Dale which justifies the 
Court’s conclusion. See Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 1019 
(2013) (“Another advantage is that, because freedom of association protects expressive 
association, it forces organizations to be clear about their membership rules and about what 
membership in their organizations represents and expresses. It would be better to force 
religious organizations to state openly their willingness to discriminate on the basis of race, 
gender, disabilities, sexual orientation, national origin, and age than to give them the free pass 
to disobey the laws for any reason that the Court awarded them in Hosanna-Tabor.”). 
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effort” to regulate membership in an expressive association.61 
Accordingly, the State lacked a truly compelling interest that could 
justify intruding upon the organization’s interest in expressive 
association. Indeed, the State cannot “interfere with speech for no 
better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a 
disfavored one.”62 
Yet this is precisely the rationale underlying the Scout ban.63 As 
Noah Feldman has pointed out, the ultimate purpose of the ban on 
membership in organizations that engage in discrimination is to 
express collective moral disapproval of discriminatory 
organizations.64 However, as Feldman argues, this rationale is clearly 
problematic when read against the Court’s ruling in Dale. Dale 
makes it clear that, despite society’s clearly compelling interest in 
limiting discrimination, a ban on expressive associations exceeds the 
limits of the First Amendment.65 If a group is protected by First 
Amendment association rights, then punishing an organization or its 
members in order to show moral disapproval of the organization’s 
membership practices is forbidden under the First Amendment. 
Furthermore, under Dale, it is clear that the Scout ban 
significantly burdens judges’ freedom of association. Judges are no 
longer able to join an expressive association and to partner with 
likeminded individuals. While judges are free to be members of other 
organizations, those judges who feel connected to the Scout’s motto 
are barred from association. As a result, they are unable to participate 
 
 61.  Dale, 530 U.S. at 661. 
 62.  Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 
579 (1995). 
 63.  See Grindlay, supra note 5, at 562 . 
 64.  Noah Feldman, Should California Judges Join the Boy Scouts?, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
(Jan. 27, 2015, 8:54 AM EST), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-27/ 
should-california-judges-join-the-boy-scouts-. 
 65.  Thus, even if society can be said to have a compelling interest in limiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, it does not necessarily follow that it has a 
compelling interest in restricting associative freedoms on that basis. See Tribe, supra note 60, at 
654 (“Indeed, even when a particular characteristic has come to be seen as presumptively 
impermissible for the state to employ in classifying persons, as I believe sexual orientation 
ought to be, the state’s interest in imposing that particular egalitarian and liberty-enhancing 
vision upon a private person or association cannot automatically be deemed compelling 
without further inquiry into the size and nature of the association and the adverse social or 
economic consequences for those ‘discriminated’ against.”). 
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in the many valuable community- and society-building activities 
of Scouting. 
Moreover, the Ban also burdens the associational rights of the 
BSA: If forbidding an expressive association from excluding an 
individual violates freedom of association, then certainly forbidding 
an association from including an individual that it wishes to see as a 
member likewise violates freedom of association.66 
B. The Scout Ban Burdens Free Exercise Interests 
The Scout ban also restricts the free exercise of religious judges, 
churches, and the BSA itself. And it does so in a way that requires 
the application of strict scrutiny. 
 
1. The ban places burdens on faiths that see scouting as a 
religious ministry  
 
Participation in Boy Scouts is an important facet of the youth 
programs of a variety of churches in the United States. For instance, 
for Catholics, “[p]articipation in Boy Scouts is a Youth Ministry of 
the Catholic Church” with meetings occurring on church property 
and with the participation of priests.67 Likewise, for the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the “LDS” or “Mormon” Church), 
Scouting “functions as an integral part of the Church’s activity 
program.”68 Indeed, individuals in the LDS Church are occasionally 
given church assignments to serve in the Boy Scout program. As one 
California judge described it: “The men consider it a religious 
obligation and commitment to accept these assignments and to assist 
 
 66.  Of the burdened rights, ruling on the freedom of association grounds likely has the 
broadest implications for laws that exclude judges from group membership. Any restriction on 
membership in expressive associations such as the Boy Scouts would be highly suspect and 
subject to strict scrutiny. Given that the Dale decision dealt specifically with membership in the 
Boy Scouts, this argument also seems the most likely to gain traction among judges reviewing 
a challenge to the canon. 
 67.  AMENDMENT COMMENTARY, supra note 25, cmt. 332 at 142 (comment of Hon. 
Barbara A. Kronlund); see also Scouting in the Catholic Community, BOY SCOUTS AM., 
http://www.scouting.org/About/FactSheets/operating_orgs/Catholic.aspx (last updated 
Mar. 2011). 
 68.  Scouting in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints Community, BOY SCOUTS 
AM., http://www.scouting.org/About/FactSheets/operating_orgs/Latter-day_Saints.aspx 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2015). 
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with the Boy Scout program.”69 Service in the Scouts is seen by 
individuals as part of “their duty to God.”70 
For members of these churches and many other faiths, the ban 
would substantially burden the free exercise of religion. Even though 
in theory one is able to attend Boy Scout events without being a 
member of the organization, attending critical events such as Scout 
Camp with one’s children requires formal membership in the Boy 
Scouts.71 Moreover, individuals feel a duty to accept assignments that 
are given by religious leaders, which could include service in Boy 
Scout leadership. One commentator emphasized that: “[b]ecause of 
my faith, I do not feel it would be appropriate to turn down such 
‘callings’ of service.”72 Another California judge emphasized that, 
“[t]o deprive me of serving as a member or leader in my 
congregation’s local boy scout [sic] units would, at least in my case, 
deny me the religious freedom preserved by the Constitutions I have 
taken a solemn oath to uphold.”73 Thus, it is clear that the free 
exercise rights of these judges would be substantially burdened by 
the ban. 
The Boy Scout ban also burdens the free exercise interests of the 
many churches that sponsor Boy Scout units. Indeed, some religious 
organizations, such as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, consider Scout leadership to be a ministerial calling. 
Effectively prohibiting a church from appointing a judge to a 
particular ministerial position seems deeply inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s conclusion in Hosanna-Tabor that such 
interference in the internal affairs of churches violates both the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.74 At a minimum, such 
 
 69.  AMENDMENT COMMENTARY, supra note 25, cmt. 14 at 11 (comment of Philip M. 
Andersen, Sr.).  
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. cmt. 332 at 146 (comment of Hon. Barbara A. Kronlund). 
 72.  Id. cmt. 350 at 157 (comment of Nathan Lewis). 
 73.  Id. cmt. 369 at 163 (comment of Hon. Roger L. Lund). 
 74.  Of course, the application of the ministerial exception requires a threshold finding 
that a position is ministerial. Although a fuller discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of 
this article, it seems highly likely at the very least that a member of the LDS Church who is 
called to be a Young Men’s Leader and a Scout Leader is a minister. Some of the public 
commentary on the proposed amendment illustrates this point. For instance, one 
commentator noted that “[p]articipation is done by calling or assignment by church leaders. It 
is generally accepted that such a ‘call’ is by divine direction and rejection of such a calling 
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a prohibition is a serious intrusion into a church’s free exercise 
interest in choosing its own ministers and leaders. In particular, with 
the LDS Church, many adult leaders, including bishops (the 
equivalent of parish priests), are expected to register with the Boy 
Scouts—which makes this restriction on the ability of churches to 
select ministers even more troubling from a free 
exercise standpoint.75 
The free exercise rights of the Boy Scouts as an organization 
might also be burdened by the ban. Although the Boy Scouts does 
not formally claim to be a religious organization, it persuasively 
established in Dale that its gay Scout leader ban is motivated by 
religious and moral teachings.76 And with its Hobby Lobby decision, 
 
would not be appropriate.” Id. cmt. 5 at 4 (comment of Franklin C. Adams); see also id. cmt. 
14 at 11 (comment of Philip M. Andersen, Sr.) (“The men feel it is their duty to God to hold 
these leadership positions in the Boy Scout program.”); id. cmt. 43 at 296 (comment of Jeffrey 
S. Bostwick) ( “The willingness of Latter-day Saints to respond to calls to serve is a 
representation of their desire to do the will of the Lord . . . . It is not in the proper spirit for us 
to decide where we will serve or where we will not. It does not matter what the call may be.” 
(quoting Boyd K. Packer, Acting President of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 167th Semiannual General Conference: Called to 
Serve (Oct. 4, 1997), in ENSIGN, Nov. 1997)). 
 75.  Id. cmt. 532 at 241 (comment of Jeffrey W. Shields). 
 76.  There is considerable ongoing debate as to whether the Boy Scouts is a religious 
organization. The Boy Scouts currently maintains that although it is motivated by religious 
values, it is not a religious organization. A federal district court judge in California concluded 
that the Boy Scouts was a religious organization for purposes of the Establishment Clause. See 
Associated Press, Court Won’t Hear Appeal on Boy Scouts Land Rental, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB. (May 3, 2010, 8:24 AM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/may/03/court-
wont-hear-appeal-on-boy-scouts-land-rental/. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conclusion that 
the Boy Scouts “is a religious organization” as a result of the reference to Duty to God in the 
Scout oath and encouragement for members to earn the religious emblem of their faith. 
Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego, 704 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012). For discussion in 
the media, see The O’Reilly Factor: Is the Boy Scouts of America a Religious Organization? 
(FoxNews television broadcast Jan. 15, 2003), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2004/01/ 
16/is-boy-scouts-america-religious-organization/ (partial transcript of broadcast). Other 
courts, in contrast, have concluded the opposite. See Powell v. Bunn, 59 P.3d 559, 579-80 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that the Boy Scouts is not religious because “the bulk of Boy 
Scouts’ activities is secular”); see also Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch. Dist. of 
Ladue, 859 F. Supp. 1239, 1248 (E.D. Mo. 1993); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. 
Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 160 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Powell v. Bunn, 59 P.3d 559 (Or. Ct. App. 
2002). The Boy Scouts itself has made arguments regarding religious freedom, which suggest 
that it sees itself as religious to some degree or another. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 742 F. 
Supp. 1413, 1435 (N.D. Ill. 1990); see also Erez Reuveni, On Boy Scouts and Anti-
Discrimination Law: The Associational Rights of Quasi-Religious Organizations, 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 109, 113 (2006) (arguing “that the BSA is a quasi-religious organization deserving 
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the Court made it clear that entities that are not formally religiously 
affiliated may still bring religious freedom claims.77 
Because the values of the Boy Scouts are heavily religiously 
motivated, it is problematic for the State to conclude that the group 
practices invidious discrimination in the first place. The canon 
requires consideration of whether the group is “dedicated to the 
preservation of religious, ethnic, or cultural values of legitimate 
common interest to its members.”78 Yet, as the Supreme Court has 
noted, “it is no business of courts to say that what is a religious 
practice or activity for one group is not religion under the protection 
of the First Amendment.”79 Classifying the Boy Scouts as a non-
religious organization that engages in invidious discrimination, while 
exempting other similarly situated church-led youth organizations, is 
thus deeply problematic and suggests that one of the aims of the law 
seems to be shaming the Boy Scouts into changing its religiously 
motivated practices by making membership in the organization seem 
unacceptable or undesirable.80 
 
 
greater associational protections than secular organizations”). See generally Zoë Robinson, 
What Is A “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181, 210 (2014). 
 77.  The Hobby Lobby decision only concerned an interpretation of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act rather than the First Amendment itself. Nevertheless, there is no 
reason to believe that the application of RFRA to non-religiously affiliated organizations would 
not also apply equally to the First Amendment. 
 78.  To determine this, the State would be required to engage in a burdensome and 
sweeping inquiry into the group’s religious beliefs and practices to determine whether the 
group in fact engages in invidious discrimination. As the New York Judicial Ethics Advisory 
Committee acknowledged when it was asked to determine whether the Freemasons engaged in 
invidious discrimination, such a determination would require a “fair ranging investigation into 
the history, background, policies and internal membership of the organization.” New York 
Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Opinion 96–82 (1997), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/ 
judicialethics/opinions/96-82.htm. Yet, such a “fair ranging investigation” into the policies 
and practices of quasi-religious organizations such as the Boy Scouts also raises Establishment 
Clause concerns. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause As a Structural Restraint on 
Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 77 (1998) (“[R]egulatory burdens that touch on 
matters in the religious domain (doctrine, polity, clerics, church membership) violate 
no establishment.”). 
 79.  Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953). 
 80.  See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 
99 VA. L. REV. 917, 977 (2013) (using the Dale case to emphasize that rights of religion and 
association exceed the scope of religious organizations). 
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2. Why these burdens require strict scrutiny  
 
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court broke with 
past precedent and concluded that neutral and generally applicable 
laws which incidentally burden religious expression are presumptively 
valid and are only subject to rational basis review.81 Under such a 
standard, the ban would almost certainly be upheld.82 However, 
there are at least two bases under which strict scrutiny may still be 
the appropriate standard of review: First, the hybrid rights 
exemption, and second, the fact that the Boy Scout ban can be said 
to be directly discriminatory on the basis of religion. 
 
a. The hybrid rights exception should apply. As to the first basis: 
The Court in Smith pointed to a potential hybrid rights exception as 
a way to explain certain classes of violations of religious freedom 
which had previously been subject to strict scrutiny. The Court 
explained: “The only decisions in which we have held that the First 
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to 
religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise 
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other 
constitutional protections.”83 As an illustration, the Court pointed to 
cases that involved laws that adversely impacted “the right of 
parents . . . to direct the education of their children.”84 The Court 
also expressly noted that “it is easy to envision a case in which a 
challenge on freedom of association grounds would likewise be 
reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns.”85 
Although there is considerable scholarly debate as to whether the 
hybrid rights exception has any independent weight, this case seems 
to be a paradigmatic case for the application of such an exception if it 
 
 81.  Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding the 
denial of unemployment benefits to Native Americans fired because of their religious use 
of peyote). 
 82.  While Part III argues extensively that preventing the appearance of partiality should 
not be a compelling governmental interest, it certainly can be classified as a legitimate 
governmental interest, and there is little question that the ban is at least rationally related to 
advancing that interest. 
 83.  Emp’t Div., 494 U.S. at 881. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 882. 
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exists.86 It involves both freedom of association claims, which have 
religious implications, and restrictions on the ability of parents to 
freely direct the religious upbringing of their children, which will be 
discussed below.87 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a case that more 
fully presents a hybrid claim of the type talked about in Smith 
because each of the other claims is “reinforced” by the existence of 
deeply held religious beliefs that urge membership in the Boy Scouts. 
Moreover, given that freedom of association and freedom of speech 
are somewhat muddled when applied to government employees, this 
might be a case in which the hybrid rights claim has teeth and would 
be embraced by a court hoping to avoid stepping into the employee-
speech quagmire.88 
 
b. The ban purposefully singles out religious practice for 
discriminatory treatment. The other major exception to the standard 
articulated in Smith arises in cases where religious observance is 
singled out for targeting or discriminatory treatment. In Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court applied strict 
scrutiny to such a law enacted by the City of Hialeah, which 
restricted religious ritual sacrifice while carving out a wide range of 
exemptions for other causes.89 The Court explained that “if the 
object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of 
their religious motivation, the law is not neutral.”90 Even though the 
statute in question at first glance appeared facially neutral, the Court 
held that the Free Exercise Clause “forbids subtle departures from 
 
 86.  See Benjamin I. Siminou, Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Rights: An Analysis of the 
Nebraska Supreme Court’s Approach to the Hybrid-Rights Exception in Douglas County v. 
Anaya, 85 NEB. L. REV. 311 (2006) (arguing that a Nebraska court should have applied strict 
scrutiny in a case regarding parent’s refusal to get medical care for their child); Hope Lu, 
Comment, Addressing the Hybrid-Rights Exception: How the Colorable-Plus Approach Can 
Revive the Free Exercise Clause, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 257 (2012); Fredrick Mark Gedicks, 
Three Questions about Hybrid Rights and Religious Groups, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 192 
(2008), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/three-questions-about-hybrid-rights-and-
religious-groups. 
 87.  Infra Section II.C. 
 88.  See infra Section II.D. 
 89.  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 90.  Id. at 533. 
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neutrality” and “covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.”91 
“[G]overnmental hostility which is masked” is still forbidden.92 
To determine whether a law that appeared facially neutral in fact 
was motivated by anti-religious animus, the Court considered several 
factors: It looked to the language of the text, the disparate impact 
the law would have on religious organizations, and the legislative 
history—all of which suggested the law was motivated out of a desire 
to harm a religious observance.93 The Court also was concerned with 
the law’s lack of general applicability, explaining that “inequality 
results when a legislature decides that the governmental interests it 
seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct 
with a religious motivation.”94 Severe under-inclusion was thus fatal. 
Just as with the religious animal slaughter in Lukumi, the Scout 
ban “pursues the [government’s] . . . interests only against conduct 
motivated by religious belief.”95 While it theoretically bans 
membership in any organization that engages in invidious 
discrimination, it is clear from the proposal and commentary that the 
ban was focused on membership in a particular set of organizations 
whose policies on homosexuality are based on the religious beliefs of 
its major allies. Thus, while the law theoretically might apply to 
other youth groups such as the Girl Scouts, it is clearly “covert 
suppression of particular religious beliefs” and a not so subtle 
departure from neutrality.96 Indeed, the commentary is filled with 
criticism of the beliefs that animate the Boy Scouts as well as 
comments generally hostile to religion.97 In addition, membership in 
other public and community organizations is not merely allowed, 
but encouraged.98 
Nor should the analysis change because the State is eliminating 
an existing exemption that was crafted for the Boy Scouts. Indeed, 
the circumstances of the passage of this change lend even more 
credence to a conclusion of animus. A previously rejected 
 
 91.  Id. at 534. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 540–43. 
 94.  Id. at 542–43. 
 95.  Id. at 545. 
 96.  Id. at 534. 
 97.  See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 98.  See infra Section IV.A. 
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amendment was revived precisely at the time when the Boy Scouts 
came under increased criticism for their policies and passed in short 
order despite an overwhelming number of critical public comments. 
This suggests not merely disagreement with the Scouts’ membership 
practices but hostility to the religious beliefs and practices underlying 
the organization’s policy. Accordingly, the Lukumi exception should 
apply to California’s ban, and the State should be required to justify 
it by offering a compelling governmental interest and showing that it 
has advanced that interest through the least restrictive 
means possible. 
Even if neither of these exceptions applies, heightened scrutiny 
may still apply as a matter of state law. Many states have either passed 
state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs) or interpreted 
their own constitutions to require a heightened level of protection 
for free exercise claims.99 While California does not have a RFRA and 
has refused to decide whether or not it follows Employment Division 
v. Smith as a matter of State constitutional law, if other states with 
RFRAs adopt similar bans, heightened scrutiny should apply to 
those bans.100 
Moreover, the line between forbidding religiously motivated 
membership in organizations such as the Boy Scouts and excluding 
membership in religious organizations is quite thin.101 Indeed, some 
have argued that membership in religious organizations inevitably 
leads to judicial partiality on a wide variety of topics. For instance, 
one commentator on the proposed amendment urged eliminating 
the religious exemption altogether because membership in a religion 
can limit the ability of a judge to apply “the law in an impartial 
 
 99.  WILLIAM W. BASSETT, W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & ROBERT T. SMITH, RELIGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 2:63 (2013). 
 100.  Id. § 2:64. 
 101.  See Eric Metaxas, De-Judging the Boy Scouts, BREAKPOINT (Feb. 5, 2010, 8:00 
AM), http://www.breakpoint.org/bpcommentaries/entry/12/26818 (“It’s not that hard to 
imagine a setting in the not-too-distant future when membership in any of these religious 
groups will be seen as incompatible with being a judge. This is especially true when you learn 
that the advisory panel cited ‘recent developments in the law regarding same-sex relationships.’ 
While religious groups are still exempt for now, these same ‘recent developments’ have made 
their First Amendment rights increasingly precarious.”). 
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matter.”102 Of course, banning membership in a religious 
organization would raise deeper Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clause concerns and be deeply inconsistent with our nation’s history 
and tradition. Yet, if the State’s interest is truly compelling enough 
to ban membership in the Boy Scouts, why is that interest not also 
sufficiently compelling to limit membership in 
religious organizations?103 
Indeed, one California judge plausibly argued in his comment on 
the proposed change that allowing for individuals to belong to 
religious groups that participate in discrimination, but not certain 
other groups that likewise practice discrimination, “cannot promote 
public confidence in the judiciary” and is therefore inconsistent with 
the State’s interest.104 It is difficult to make a principled case for 
allowing judges to belong to religious associations that engage in so-
called invidious discrimination but not in secular associations that do 
the same. Regardless, the Scout ban burdens the associational and 
free exercise rights of judges from a wide variety of religious 
backgrounds, and does so in ways that require strict scrutiny.105 
 
 102.  AMENDMENT COMMENTARY, supra note 25, cmt. 225 at 98 (comment of 
Elena Gross). 
 103.  One reason might be avoiding a clear violation of the Establishment Clause. 
Indeed, a violation of the Establishment Clause would serve as a total bar on government 
conduct and there can be no sufficiently compelling interest to justify a violation. As Professor 
Esbeck argued in a highly influential article, the Establishment Clause serves as a structural 
restraint on government rather than a “rights based” clause. See Esbeck, supra note 78; see also 
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Incorporation of the Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, 
Textual, and Historical Account, 88 IND. L.J. 669 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1997807 (arguing that this is one of the key reasons that the Establishment Clause was rightly 
incorporated against the states). Yet, as already mentioned, the Scout ban in and of itself raises 
the same Establishment Clause concerns. See supra notes 62, 65, & 66 and accompanying text. 
 104.  AMENDMENT COMMENTARY, supra note 25, cmt. 342 at 152 (comment of Hon. 
Edward F. Lee). 
 105.  A ruling on the Free Exercise Clause would be narrow, as the proper remedy would 
be to allow membership in organizations where membership is seen as part of a judge’s 
religious obligations and duties. One shortcoming with this approach is that it allows certain 
judges the ability to belong to a group, while denying others the ability to belong to the same 
group, even though both wish to affiliate with the group and identify with the group’s purpose 
and mission. Thus, a ruling on the Free Exercise Clause or a state RFRA would be somewhat 
less desirable than a ruling on one of the other proposed bases discussed here. 
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C. The Scout Ban Burdens the Rights of Some Parents to Direct the 
Upbringing of Their Children 
A restriction on a judge’s participation in Boy Scouts may also 
infringe that judge’s ability to direct the upbringing of his children. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “the interest of parents in 
the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest 
of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”106 
Because many parents want to help direct their children’s education 
through participation in Scouting, and sometimes are required to 
participate so that their children may participate in key events such as 
scout camp,107 the ban on Scout membership substantially burdens 
this fundamental right. 
In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court first considered this 
parental right when it invalidated an ordinance that made teaching 
children in any language other than English illegal if those students 
had not yet passed the eighth grade.108 The Court explained that the 
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment protected 
the right of an individual to “establish a home and bring up 
children.”109 The Court emphasized that “it is the natural duty of the 
parent to give his children education suitable to their station in 
life.”110 It was improper for the State to interfere “with the power of 
parents to control the education of their own.”111 
The Supreme Court again affirmed the fundamental nature of 
this right in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, when it struck down a 
compulsory education law which would have restricted the ability of 
parents to educate their children at home or through private 
schools.112 The Court famously emphasized that “[t]he child is not 
the mere creature of the State,” and that parents “who nurture him 
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to 
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”113 
 
 106.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
 107.  See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 108.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397–99 (1923). 
 109.  Id. at 399. 
 110.  Id. at 400. 
 111.  Id. at 401. 
 112.  Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 113.  Id. at 535. 
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The parental autonomy right recognized in both Meyer and 
Pierce was further extended by Wisconsin v. Yoder, in which the 
Court upheld the right of Amish families to violate compulsory 
school laws on Free Exercise grounds.114 The Court emphasized: 
“the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and 
education of their children in their early and formative years have a 
high place in our society” and that, absent “a state interest of 
sufficient magnitude,” any restriction on such direction would be 
invalid.115 Any law that substantially burdens parental autonomy 
must, therefore, survive strict scrutiny.116 
More recent decisions have also reaffirmed the vital interest that 
parents have in directing the upbringing of their children. In Troxel 
v. Granville, the Court invalidated a statute that allowed state courts 
to award visitation rights to a paternal grandparent against the wishes 
of the parents.117 In so doing, it emphasized that “it cannot now be 
doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”118 As the 
Court made clear: 
so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is 
fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself 
into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of 
that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of 
that parent’s children.119 
 
 114.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 115.  Id. at 213–14. 
 116.  Despite the strong language in Yoder, the Court’s decisions in this area are not 
entirely clear as to what the proper standard of review would be if a law burdened a parent’s 
right to direct his or her child’s upbringing. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his concurrence 
in Troxel v. Granville—one of the more recent Supreme Court decisions to invoke this right—
none of the other justices who embraced the parental right actually articulated “the 
appropriate standard of review.” 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice 
Thomas chose to “apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights,” id., and his 
choice seems most consistent with requiring a state interest of “sufficient magnitude,” Yoder, 
406 U.S. at 214, but it is possible that the Court might apply intermediate scrutiny. 
Considering the fundamental nature of parental autonomy, strict scrutiny appears to be the 
proper standard. 
 117.  Troxel, 530 U.S. 57. 
 118.  Id. at 66. 
 119.  Id. at 68. 
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Justice Stevens dissented, but also recognized the right and even saw 
it in a somewhat more expansive light as providing parents “a 
corresponding privacy interest—absent exceptional circumstances” 
to care and guide for their children “without the undue interference 
of strangers to them and to their child.”120 Indeed, the right to 
parental autonomy has closely been linked to the notion of a “private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”121 
For many parents, having their children participate in the Scouts 
is an integral part of the child’s moral, spiritual, and ethical 
education.122 Moreover, as one commentator noted, a parent is 
required to participate in Cub Scout activities and is expected to 
participate in Boy Scout activities as well.123 Even if parental presence 
is not strictly mandated, it is strongly encouraged.124 At the Boy 
Scouts level, moreover, only male parents are allowed to participate 
in many activities, such as campouts, which are integral to the 
Scouting program. And, for many parents, participation in Scouts 
with their children is an important bonding experience.125 Parental 
involvement also allows the parent to help ensure that the child 
 
 120.  Id. at 87; see also Bruce Frohnen, Liberation Jurisprudence: How Activist Courts 
Have Torn Family and Society Asunder, FAM. POL’Y, May–June 2001, at 1 (arguing that anti-
discrimination laws have been harmful to families because of an increasing focus on the rights 
of the individual as opposed to the collective needs and rights of the family). 
 121.  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); see also David D. Meyer, The 
Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 541 (2008). 
 122.  Indeed, in Dale, it may have been the Scouts’ critical role in helping some parents 
to bring up their children with moral values that led the Supreme Court to rule in favor of the 
Scouts. See Neal Troum, Expressive Association and the Right to Exclude: Reading Between the 
Lines in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 641, 689 (2002) (arguing 
that the fact that the Scouts played a role in childrearing was ultimately a critical factor in the 
Court’s decision to hold that the expressive association rights of the Scouts justified exclusion 
of gay Scouts); see also John C. O’Quinn, Note, Recent Developments: The United States 
Supreme Court, 1999 Term “How Solemn Is the Duty of the Mighty Chief”: Mediating the 
Conflict of Rights in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000), 24 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 319, 354 (2000) (emphasizing that the Boy Scouts embody characteristics of 
other protected intimate associations). 
 123.  AMENDMENT COMMENTARY, supra note 25, cmt. 2 at 1 (comment of 
Rene Abraham). 
 124.  Id. cmt. 493 at 217 (comment of Hon. Craig G. Riemer). 
 125.  As a practical matter, one commentator pointed out that this change might make it 
more difficult for California to attract qualified judges since judges must make the choice 
between participating in youth organizations with their families or their judicial nomination. 
Id. cmt. 484 at 212 (comment of Hon. Roger D. Randall). 
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learns the desired moral lessons from his experience in Scouts.126 
Thus, even if the children are able to participate in the Scouting 
program without their parents, the judicial Scouting ban adversely 
impacts and burdens the ability of parents to direct their child’s 
education.127 Accordingly, the Scout ban must be justified by truly 
compelling State interests and satisfy strict scrutiny.128 
 
 126.  Some scholars have argued that the Supreme Court’s parental rights doctrine is too 
focused on the rights of parents without sufficient concern for the rights of children. See, e.g., 
AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (Princeton 1987); David Gan-wing Cheng, 
Wisconsin v. Yoder: Respecting Children’s Rights and Why Yoder Should Be Overturned, 4 
CHARLOTTE L. REV. 45, 47 (2013) (arguing that Yoder should be overturned because children 
should have a “right to an open future”). But see Jocelyn Floyd, The Power of the Parental 
Trump Card: How and Why Frazier v. Winn Got It Right, 85 CHI. KENT L. REV. 791, 792 
(2010) (discussing cases involving a tension between parental and child interests); Richard W. 
Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education, and Harm to Children, 76 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 114 (2000) (arguing that harm should be narrowly defined in 
order to allow parents discretion); Stephen G. Gilles, Hey, Christians, Leave Your Kids Alone!, 
16 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 186 (1999) (reviewing JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (1998)) (defending the parent’s right against Establishment Clause 
concerns advanced by other scholars). Unlike some of those situations, allowing parental 
participation in the Boy Scouts is one situation where parental and child rights are balanced 
because the child is already participating in Scouts, so there is no sense of parental interest 
trumping the interest of the child. 
 127.  Of course, the right to direct the upbringing of one’s child does not give the parent 
unlimited rights. A parent, for instance, could not demand the right to attend school with her 
child or demand a particularized public school curriculum. But see Noa Ben-Asher, The 
Lawmaking Family, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 363 (2012) (arguing for a limited right of parents to 
influence a child’s curriculum based on values). Yet, when the Government prohibits a parent 
from participating in an activity with her children that all other parents are able to engage in, 
serious constitutional concerns arise. See Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 715, 760 (2013). This is especially true given that parents “have a 
liberty interest in rearing offspring in the parents’ chosen value systems.” Id. See generally 
Matthew Ormiston, Parental Choice and School Vouchers: A Viable Facet of Texas Public 
Education Reform?, 9 SCHOLAR 497, 518 (2007). Accordingly, a law that significantly burdens 
the “parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children” must be justified 
under strict scrutiny. Id.; see supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 128.  A ruling striking down the Scout ban on parental autonomy grounds would also be 
quite narrow in that it would only impact membership in youth organizations such as the Boy 
Scouts. Such a ruling would effectively restore the pre-existing youth organization exception 
but do little to impact membership in other non-youth organizations. On the other hand, such 
a ruling would be a pretty substantial expansion of the ability of parents to be involved in the 
upbringing of their children. 
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D. Strict Scrutiny Should Still Apply even Though the Scout Ban 
Restricts Judicial Conduct 
While it is unquestionable that a general restriction on 
membership in the Boy Scouts would raise several constitutional 
concerns, California might attempt to defend the Scout ban on the 
ground that judges are unique and have been treated differently 
both as a result of their judicial office and as a result of their general 
status as public officers. However, the Supreme Court has made it 
clear that even though the State can impose greater restrictions on its 
officers, the State is still constitutionally limited in its ability to 
restrict the exercise of fundamental rights.129 Likewise, in recent 
years, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the speech and 
conduct of judges are constitutionally protected.130 
1. Public officers generally retain their constitutional rights 
For example, the Court has made it clear that a public servant, 
including a government officer, cannot be fired “on a basis that 
 
 129.  Most of the cases deal with either freedom of speech or freedom of association 
rather than free exercise or parental autonomy, but there is no reason to think that the State 
would be allowed to impinge on these rights in situations when it cannot impinge on the 
judge’s speech rights. Indeed, it seems likely that the State would have even less of a 
justification for impinging on the parental decisions that employees or judges make, because 
these decisions are far less likely to directly impact the employees’ work. Moreover, as 
mentioned in the previous section, parental rights are also protected under a theory of privacy 
as a sphere of conduct where the Government simply has less reason to intrude or invade. As 
such, the Government has a weaker case for the termination of an employee for conduct 
involving an exercise of parental rights. 
 130.  Freedom of Association and other constitutional rights have frequently come up in 
the context of lawyers and admission to the bar. For instance, in Konigsberg v. State Bar, the 
Supreme Court overturned a decision by the California Bar to deny admission to the bar of an 
individual who was suspected of being a member of the Communist Party. 353 U.S. 252 
(1957). After concluding that the character and fitness evidence submitted on the prospective 
attorney’s behalf overwhelmingly supported his admission, the Court turned to the question 
of whether Communist Party membership would have been disqualifying. Id. at 264–68. The 
applicant was accused of membership in 1941 when the organization was fully legal and 
membership in the organization did not lead to any kind of penalty. Id. at 267–68. Nor could 
the fact that “some members of that party were involved in illegal or disloyal activities” justify 
sweeping the individual into that group and excluding him. Id. at 267. Thus, the Court has 
made it clear that such bans are highly disfavored in the context of the legal profession. See id. 
at 267–68. 
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infringes his constitutionally protected interests.”131 If the 
Government were able to do so, it would allow the Government to 
“produce a result which [the Government] could not command 
directly.”132 In other words, as a general matter of principle, the 
Government cannot penalize a public servant for conduct that it 
otherwise could not prohibit or proscribe generally. 
Likewise, the Supreme Court has made it clear that conditioning 
public employment on an employee’s pledging not to belong to a 
disfavored but legal organization is unconstitutional. For instance, in 
Elfbrandt v. Russell, the Court concluded that a loyalty oath which 
required employees to swear that they had not been members of an 
organization dedicated to overthrowing the government was 
impermissible even though overthrowing the government constitutes 
an illegal objective.133 The Court concluded that because 
membership was not necessarily “accompanied by a specific intent to 
further the unlawful aims of the organization,” this was an 
illegitimate basis for excluding an individual from 
public employment.134 
On the other hand, the Court has at times been more solicitous 
of restrictions on the freedom of speech and the free exercise of 
public officers. In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme 
Court overturned a decision to fire a teacher who wrote an opinion-
editorial that was critical of the school board.135 The Court laid out a 
balancing test “between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer.”136 However, in doing so, the Court explained 
that a teacher could not be punished for speech that had not 
 
 131.  Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). Treatment of the speech of 
lawyers is also closely analogous and highly relevant. For instance, in Gentile v. State Bar, the 
Court declared that a rule limiting the ability of lawyers to make extrajudicial statements was 
unconstitutionally void for vagueness. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). Although this decision did “not 
call into question the constitutionality of other State’s prohibitions of attorney’s speech,” the 
Court emphasized that because this was a “punishment of pure speech” there was no 
“standard of diminished First Amendment protection.” Id. at 1034–35. 
 132.  Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597. 
 133.  384 U.S. 11 (1966); accord Grindlay, supra note 5, at 564. 
 134.  Elfbrandt, 384 U.S. at 16. 
 135.  391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968). 
 136.  Id. at 568. 
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“impeded the . . . proper performance of his daily duties.”137 Because 
the teacher’s speech in Pickering did not interfere with his ability to 
teach, the State did not have a “significantly greater . . . interest in 
limiting” the teacher’s speech than that of the general public’s.138 
The Supreme Court further elaborated on the Pickering 
balancing test in Connick v. Meyers, leading this balancing test to 
commonly be referred to as the Pickering-Connick test.139 But this 
test has been highly controversial and notoriously difficult for lower 
courts to apply.140  
Moreover, for several reasons, it is doubtful that the Connick-
Pickering test applies to judges. First, judges are not employees in 
the traditional sense and often have some form of tenure and 
heightened job protection. Furthermore, many of the policy 
considerations motivating Connick, such as ensuring employee-
supervisor unity, simply do not apply in the judicial context.141 
 
 137.  Id. at 572. 
 138.  Id. at 573. 
 139.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). See generally DAVID L. HUDSON JR., 
BALANCING ACT: PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND FREE SPEECH (Dec. 2002), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/First 
Report.PublicEmployees.pdf (describing application of the Pickering-Connick test in a variety 
of contexts). 
 140.  See Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution to 
a First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 119 (2006) (“Pickering guaranteed a 
steady flow of doctrinal disputes for decades to come.”); Jessica Reed, Note, From Pickering to 
Ceballos: The Demise of the Public Employee Free Speech Doctrine, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 95, 98 
(2007) (“[T]he Court’s ruling created a compartmentalization that not only leaves public 
employees vulnerable to retaliation for exposing governmental misconduct or inefficiencies, 
but also neglects the public’s interest in hearing such speech.”); Molly K. Smith, Compelled 
Investigatory and Testimonial Speech: An Overdue Clarification of the Public Employee Speech 
Doctrine that Rehabilitates “All of the Values at Stake,” 101 KY. L.J. 403, 408 (2012–13) (“As 
the public employee speech doctrine evolved, certain drawbacks of the case-by-case approach 
of Connick-Pickering became apparent.”). 
 141.  Another lingering question is whether the Conning-Pickering test is the appropriate 
test for employee free exercise claims or religion-related statutory claims under Title VII or 
RFRA. At least two courts of appeals have applied this test in the context of religious freedom 
claims. See Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001); Brown v. Polk 
Cty., 61 F.3d 650, 658 (8th Cir. 1995). The Pickering-Conning test seems inappropriate for 
religious freedom claims insomuch that religious freedom claims should be fully protected 
whether or not they touch on a matter of public concern. For instance, a Sikh hoping to carry 
a Kirpan to work would not be expressing an opinion on any matter of great public concern, 
but participating in an act of personal devotion. Yet, it seems absurd that his claim should 
receive less protection than a claim of an individual seeking to discuss his religious views about 
homosexuality in the workplace. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the public concern prong 
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Additionally, as will be further discussed in the following section, the 
Supreme Court has emphasized that our judicial system is enriched 
rather than undermined when judges have and express their opinions 
on matters of public concern. Thus, Connick-Pickering should not 
be seen as reducing the standard of review for restrictions on judicial 
speech. Instead, strict scrutiny should apply with full force. 
Nor do other decisions applying the reasoning of Pickering 
support the Boy Scout ban. For instance, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in U.S. Civil Service Commission v. National Ass’n of Letter 
Carriers, AFL–CIO, upholding portions of the Hatch Act that 
prohibited federal employees from “taking an active part in political 
management or in political campaigns,”142 does not support the 
Scout ban. First, the Hatch Act was linked to a prohibition on civil 
servant political activity that reached back to the Jefferson 
Administration. That history thus gave the Hatch Act a strong 
historical pedigree—unlike a prohibition on judicial group 
membership, which lacks this historical pedigree.143 Moreover, unlike 
the ban on membership in only certain disfavored groups, the Hatch 
Act’s prohibitions were also truly neutral and applied equally to all 
“parties, groups, or points of view.”144 Additionally, the type of 
corruption that the Hatch Act sought to remedy, where civil servants 
received patronage and support for their electioneering conduct, is 
much more akin to quid pro quo corruption than the mere 
appearance of partiality that the State asserts exists with judicial 
membership in the Boy Scouts.145 Most importantly, the decision in 
Letter Carriers predates the Supreme Court’s recent decisions, such 
as Republican Party of Minnesota v. White146 and Citizens United v. 
FEC,147 in which efforts to reduce partiality or corruption have 
received far more searching scrutiny. Indeed, as the following section 
 
would be met in any case involving the Boy Scouts as a result of the fact that the group has 
come to stand very publically for a certain position on a matter of great public concern. 
 142.  U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL–CIO, 413 U.S. 
548, 562 (1973). 
 143.  These historical arguments seem critical to the Court’s decision and, absent the 
same historical pedigree, it is not likely that the Court would have upheld the Hatch Act. Id. 
at 577. 
 144.  Id. at 564. 
 145.  See infra Part IV. 
 146.  536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 147.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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will discuss, the Eighth Circuit, applying the Supreme Court’s 
decision in White, invalidated a law that imposed restrictions on 
judges similar to those imposed by the Hatch Act. 
 
2. The Supreme Court Has Made It Clear That Judges Are Fully 
Protected in Their Exercise of Constitutional Rights 
 
The Supreme Court has been highly skeptical of efforts to 
restrict the rights of judges. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White, the Supreme Court struck down a Minnesota judicial canon 
that forbade a judge from “announc[ing] his or her views on 
disputed legal or political issues.”148 Minnesota had a separate 
provision that forbade judges from making “pledges or promises” as 
to how they would decide a specific case before the court.149 Thus, 
the Minnesota statute dealt with positional conflicts and the 
appearance of partiality that would arise from a judge announcing his 
views on a contested issue. The Court concluded that while 
impartiality in the sense of a “lack of bias for or against either party 
to the proceeding” was essential for due process, the clause was “not 
narrowly tailored to serve impartiality (or the appearance of 
impartiality) in this sense.”150 Indeed, because the clause did not 
“restrict speech for or against particular parties, but rather speech for 
or against particular issues,” it was “barely tailored to serve that 
interest at all.”151 The Court explained that “lack of preconception 
in favor of or against a particular legal view” is “not 
a compelling state interest, as strict scrutiny requires.”152 “A judge’s 
lack of predisposition” was not “a necessary component of equal 
justice” and in fact “would be evidence of lack of qualification, not 
lack of bias.”153 Nor could creating the appearance of that type of 
impartiality be considered compelling. 
One lingering question that remained after the White decision 
was the proper standard of review for laws that impinge upon judicial 
 
 148.  536 U.S. at 768. 
 149.  MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2002); see also White, 
536 U.S. at 812–13. 
 150.  White, 536 U.S. at 775–76. 
 151.  Id. at 776. 
 152.  Id. at 777. 
 153.  Id. at 777–78. 
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free speech or other fundamental rights. The majority opinion clearly 
applied strict scrutiny, but Justice Kennedy in his concurrence, while 
agreeing that “[t]here is authority for the Court to apply strict 
scrutiny,” undertook a different analysis that focused on the content-
based nature of the restrictions.154 Kennedy also left open the 
question of “whether the rationale of Pickering . . . and Connick . . . 
could be extended to allow a general speech restriction on sitting 
judges.”155 Because Justice Kennedy was the critical fifth vote, 
circuits have split as to how to apply the White decision.156 Some 
apply strict scrutiny, while others apply the Pickering balancing 
test.157 
However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Williams-Yulee 
v. Florida Bar seems to decisively resolve this question in favor of 
strict scrutiny. In that opinion concerning restrictions on judicial 
fundraising, Chief Justice Roberts in his majority opinion clearly 
applied strict scrutiny.158 While two of the Justices in the majority 
indicated that they would not apply strict scrutiny, all four dissenting 
judges applied strict scrutiny.159 There is now therefore a clear 7-2 
 
 154.  Id. at 792 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 155.  Id. at 796. 
 156.  See Ashna Zaheer, Judging Judges: Why Strict Scrutiny Resolves the Circuit Split over 
Judicial Speech Restrictions, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 879, 882 (2011). 
 157.  See id. Another rather unsatisfying possibility is that a different standard might 
apply to appointed and elected officials. This standard would be especially problematic in a 
state like California that employs a hybrid system. It would mean that elected judges at trial 
courts can be members of the Scouts while appointed judges such as state appellate or supreme 
court judges would not. Such a standard also is difficult to apply in states like Utah where 
judges are appointed by the Governor but then subject to retention elections. See id. at 906 
(arguing that “in the case of elected judges, while the government is technically the employer, 
the judge ultimately is accountable to the people”). Zaheer makes compelling arguments that 
strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review because the expressive activity involved is 
frequently core political speech touching on matters of great public concern and such bans are 
often not content neutral. Zaheer argues that as a result of these conditions strict scrutiny 
should be triggered. Both of these factors are also present with the Boy Scout ban: 
Membership touches on matters of great public concern such as the degree to which the law 
should prohibit discrimination against homosexuals, and the Boy Scout ban is not content or 
viewpoint neutral because it allows membership in gay rights groups but not in a group such as 
the Boy Scouts with a more conservative viewpoint. See generally id. 
 158.  See infra Section III.B. for an extensive discussion of Williams-Yulee. 
 159.  It has been noted that the application of strict scrutiny by the majority was 
incredibly lax, especially in regard to the tailoring prongs. Nevertheless, this opinion clearly 
establishes that strict scrutiny is the proper standard. As will be shown in Part IV, the tailoring 
of the Boy Scout ban is far more egregious than that in the Williams-Yulee case. See Floyd 
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majority in favor of the application of strict scrutiny, at least when 
judicial speech rights are implicated.160 
The Court’s conclusion in White directly implicates the Scout 
ban. Indeed, on remand after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
White, the Eighth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s ruling to 
invalidate a ban on partisan political activities on the part of judges. 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the ban on group membership 
was meant “to keep judges from aligning with particular views on 
issues by keeping them from aligning with a particular political 
party” and was therefore constitutionally suspect.161 The court 
reasoned that the argument “that associating with a particular 
group will destroy a judge’s impartiality-differs only in form from 
that which purportedly supports the announce clause-that expressing 
one’s self on particular issues will destroy a judge’s impartiality”—the 
very argument the Supreme Court had rejected in White.162 The 
court therefore applied traditional strict scrutiny and found that the 
law violated the judge’s right to freedom of association. In rejecting 
the State’s purported interest, moreover, the court rejected the 
notion that mere membership in a political party could create bias 
and explained that “any credible claim of bias would have to flow 
from something more than the bare fact that the judge had 
associated with” a partisan organization.163 
 
Abrams, Symposium: When Strict Scrutiny Ceased to be Strict, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 30, 2015, 
9:47 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/04/symposium-when-strict-scrutiny-ceased-
to-be-strict/ (“But the scrutiny actually provided by the majority to the Florida Code 
provision was anything but strict. Justice Samuel Alito rightly concluded that the rule at issue 
was ‘about as narrowly tailored as a burlap bag.’”). 
 160.  Chief Justice Roberts, in dicta, briefly suggested that freedom of association might 
be treated differently when he emphasized that the less stringent standard of Buckley v. Valeo 
applied because that case was about “freedom of political association.” Williams-Yulee v. Fla. 
Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665 (2015) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24 (1976) (per 
curiam)). However, Justice Roberts here is attempting to distinguish Buckley from the total 
solicitation ban in Williams-Yulee and it is obvious that freedom of speech and association are 
closely related rights. As mentioned in Section II.A., freedom of association claims traditionally 
trigger strict scrutiny and this opinion provides no reason to treat the rights of judges 
differently. Moreover, other rights implicated such as free exercise and parental autonomy 
clearly trigger strict scrutiny. As such, this article will proceed with the assumption that strict 
scrutiny is the proper standard when the associative, religious, and parental rights of judges are 
implicated just as it is for speech rights. 
 161.  Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 754 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
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White and the subsequent Eighth Circuit opinion, as well as 
Williams-Yulee, stand strongly for the principle that judges are 
entitled to exercise their constitutional rights free from interference 
by the State and make it clear that laws that burden the expressive 
and associative rights of judges will be subject to searching scrutiny. 
III. AVOIDING THE APPEARANCE OF JUDICIAL IMPROPRIETY IS 
NOT A COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST 
As the preceding section shows, the Boy Scout ban impacts 
multiple fundamental rights, any of which would be sufficient to 
require strict scrutiny. Even though judges are public officers, that 
fact does not reduce the State’s burden of justification. Thus, to 
justify its ban, California would need to offer a compelling interest of 
the highest magnitude and also show that its policy is as narrowly 
tailored as possible to meet its compelling interest.164 
The chief interest advanced by the California Supreme Court in 
its rulemaking was avoiding “the appearance of impropriety,” which 
in its view “diminishe[s] public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary.”165 While it is generally not controversial 
that avoiding judicial impropriety in specific cases is a compelling state 
interest, it is not settled whether a more generalized fear of the 
appearance of impropriety qualifies as a compelling governmental 
interest. Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent campaign 
finance decisions suggest a great skepticism on the Court’s part of 
arguments based on general appearances of impropriety or 
corruption.166 In that context, the Court has held that only 
preventing quid pro quo corruption can be a compelling interest. 
This suggests that preventing a generalized appearance of 
 
 164.  As Justice Breyer pointed out in oral arguments for the Williams-Yulee case, which 
will be discussed in detail in the following section, the Court has never expressly used the 
wording “strict scrutiny” in cases regarding judicial speech. It has, however, suggested a very 
heightened standard of review. 
 165.  See supra Part I. 
 166.  I am not the only one to draw a connection between Dale and the Court’s 
campaign finance decisions. See Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and 
Association Rights After Knox v. Seiu, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023 (2013) 
(discussing Dale and Citizens United, and their impact on mandatory union dues); Mark D. 
Bauer, Freedom of Association for College Fraternities After Christian Legal Society and Citizens 
United, 39 J.C. & U.L. 247, 299 (2013) (considering how Citizens United might impact the 
Court’s decision in Christian Legal Society). 
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impropriety, as opposed to impropriety or bias in specific cases, does 
not constitute a compelling governmental interest. Although the 
Supreme Court’s recent Williams-Yulee opinion suggests that it will 
provide greater latitude to the State in its efforts to prevent the 
appearance of judicial impropriety, these decisions taken as a whole 
still suggest that a mere abstract and generalized appearance of 
impropriety will not be sufficient. 
A. The Court’s Campaign Finance Decisions Show That Avoiding the 
Appearance of Impropriety Is Not a Compelling Interest 
While the connection between campaign finance and the rights 
burdened by the Scout Ban may seem oblique, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has made this connection explicit, at least as to the freedom of 
association. In Buckley v. Valeo itself, for example, the Court 
acknowledged that finance restrictions “impinge on protected 
associational freedoms.”167 More recently, in McCutcheon v. Federal 
Election Commission, the Court suggested that aggregate donation 
limits restrict a potential donor’s ability “to exercise his expressive 
and associational rights.”168 Moreover, while the Supreme Court has 
always been suspicious of campaign finance reform laws, it has in 
recent years increasingly struck down laws that the Government has 
attempted to justify on the basis of avoiding a generalized 
appearance of impropriety or corruption. 
The Court’s approach to this issue has evolved substantially since 
Buckley v. Valeo, in which the Court first considered a constitutional 
challenge to the Federal Election Campaign Act.169 In that decision, 
the Court upheld a wide range of campaign finance measures, 
including a cap on the amount of donations that can be given to any 
single candidate in a given year. In doing so, the Court held that 
“the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption” is a 
“constitutionally sufficient justification” for the limits.170 The Court 
stated that “the impact of the appearance of corruption” was “[o]f 
almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo 
 
 167.  424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976). 
 168.  134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014). 
 169.  424 U.S. at 1. 
 170.  Id. at 25–26. 
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arrangements.”171 In response to the overbreadth challenge brought 
by those opposing the limit, the Court explained that Congress was 
justified “in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety.”172 
Indeed, the Buckley Court even accepted a congressional interest in 
“the appearance of the purity and openness of the federal election 
process” as an important state interest.173 
Since Buckley, however, the Supreme Court has gradually 
undermined the basis of that decision. In Citizens United v. FEC, the 
Court struck down a prohibition on electioneering activities during a 
campaign by corporations and unions.174 In doing so, the Court 
emphasized that, while “the potential for quid pro quo corruption” 
justified limits on direct contributions to candidates, it could not 
justify a limit on independent campaign related expenditures.175 
While the Court paid some lip service to the prevention of the 
appearance of corruption, it is clear that the Court was skeptical of 
general efforts to simply create the appearance of fairness. Indeed, 
the Court emphasized that “[r]eliance on a ‘generic favoritism or 
influence theory . . . is at odds with standard First Amendment 
analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no 
limiting principle.’”176 
The Court’s more recent McCutcheon v. FEC decision is even 
more explicit in the limits it places on campaign finance 
restrictions.177 There the Court struck down aggregate spending 
limits that curtailed donations to candidates and political 
party committees. 
While the dissent emphasized that these laws serve “the public’s 
interest” in ensuring a more representative and fair government,178 
the majority rejected any effort to “define the boundaries of the First 
Amendment by reference to such a generalized conception of the 
public good.”179 The Court made clear that “preventing corruption 
 
 171.  Id. at 25–27. 
 172.  Id. at 30. 
 173.  Id. at 78. 
 174.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 175.  Id. at 345. 
 176.  Id. at 359. 
 177.  134 S. Ct. 1434, 1434 (2014). 
 178.  Id. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 179.  Id. at 1449 (Roberts, J., plurality opinion). 
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or the appearance of corruption” is the only legitimate governmental 
interest for restricting campaign contributions.180 And the 
McCutcheon Court went even further, emphasizing that “Congress 
may target only a specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ 
corruption.’”181 Simply limiting “the appearance of corruption 
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse 
inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions” was 
not sufficient.182 Nor was the mere possibility that large expenditures 
may lead to “‘influence over or access to’ elected officials or political 
parties.”183 Likewise, the Court emphasized that “the Government’s 
interest in preventing the appearance of corruption is equally 
confined to the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.”184 
Accordingly, limiting “the appearance of mere influence or access” 
is insufficient.185 
The Court also rejected the government’s argument “that there 
is an opportunity for corruption whenever a large check is given to a 
legislator.”186 It held instead that only contributions made by an 
individual or group to a specific legislator can be said to cause quid 
pro quo corruption.187 The “basic nature of the party system,” the 
Court said, “in which [individuals] join together to further common 
political beliefs,” creates feelings of “particular gratitude,” but such 
feelings of “shared interest” are not preventable.188 Labeling them as 
“quid pro quo corruption would dramatically expand government 
regulation of the political process” and be invalid.189 Indeed, such 
feelings of “particular gratitude” and “shared interest” are inherent 
in the democratic process and are not indicia of the existence of quid 
pro quo corruption.190  
 
 180.  Id. at 1450. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. at 1451. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. at 1460. 
 187.  Id. at 1461. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
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Thus, while the Court reaffirmed that “[t]he Government has a 
strong interest . . . in combatting corruption and its appearance,” 
that interest had to “be limited to a specific kind of corruption.”191 
Only direct efforts to influence the decision making of legislator 
qualified. Neither general feelings of gratitude caused by common 
associational interests, nor the mere sense of special access, could 
justify limits on expressive and associational freedoms.192 
B. While Williams-Yulee Suggests That the Court Is More Willing to 
Find a Compelling Interest in the Judicial Context, It Remains 
Unlikely to Find a Compelling Interest Absent a Likelihood of Quid 
Pro Quo Corruption 
This year, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld a 
provision of the Florida Supreme Court’s Code of Judicial Conduct 
that restricts judges from engaging in direct solicitation of funds for 
their judicial campaigns.193 Although parties argued extensively based 
on Citizens United and McCutcheon, the Court dismissed these 
comparisons and explained that “a State’s interest in preserving 
public confidence in the integrity of its judiciary extends beyond its 
interest in preventing the appearance of corruption in legislative and 
executive elections.”194 The Court also emphasized that “[s]tates 
may regulate judicial elections differently than they regulate political 
elections, because the role of judges differs from the role of 
politicians.”195 The Court even went so far as to say that “our 
precedents applying the First Amendment to political elections have 
little bearing on the issues here.”196 
Despite the Court’s unwillingness to apply its campaign finance 
decisions directly in the judicial context, the Court went to great 
lengths to emphasize the concrete nature of the impropriety that the 
State was combatting. Unlike the Scout Ban, the policy in Florida 
was specifically focused on quid pro quo corruption,197 and the 
 
 191.  Id. at 1462. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
 194.  Id. at 1667. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (No. 13-1499) 
(“There are three interests. One, the interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. One 
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Florida Bar explained the purpose of the canon as “to prevent the 
appearance of quid pro quo, bias or corruption, and to preserve the 
integrity of our judiciary and maintain the public’s confidence in an 
impartial judiciary.”198 A judge that gets a donation from an 
individual who frequently appears before the Court will readily 
create the appearance of a direct conflict of interest or judicial 
corruption in a way that mere group membership cannot. It was thus 
reasonable for the State to conclude that “the public may lack 
confidence in a judge’s ability to administer justice without fear or 
favor if he comes to office by asking for favors.”199 As the Court 
explained, “it is the regrettable but unavoidable appearance that 
judges who personally ask for money may diminish their integrity,” 
which justifies the restriction.200 
The majority also emphasized the coercive and corrupting 
influence of direct judicial solicitations: It pointed out that those 
solicited will personally fear retaliation from the judge if they do not 
donate and that potential litigants will be forced to select attorneys 
based on who has made the requested donations.201 Indeed, the 
Court elsewhere has made clear that individual litigants have a due 
process right against the “probability of actual bias” caused by an 
opposing party’s financial support to a judge.202 Accordingly, the 
Florida restriction sought to target not the mere suggestion of 
partiality, but the influence of coercive requests for donations on the 
judicial process. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her concurrence, 
 
[sic], the interest in promoting impartiality/preventing bias. And third, the interest in 
protecting persons solicited against coercion.”). 
 198.  Brief for Petitioner at 14, Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (No. 13-1499), 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/13-1499-ts-1.pdf (quoting 
Amended Answer Brief at 8, Fla. Bar v Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d 379 (Fla 2014), aff’d, 135 
S. Ct. 1656 (No. SC11-265), http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/briefs/2011/201-
400/11-265_AnsBrief.pdf); see also Fla. Bar, 138 So. 3d at 385 (Fla. 2014) (“Therefore, in 
light of this Court’s prior holding that Florida has a compelling interest in protecting the 
integrity of the judiciary and maintaining the public’s confidence in an impartial judiciary—a 
holding that is bolstered by the broad acceptance of comparable compelling State interests by 
other state supreme courts—we conclude that Canon 7C(1), which furthers these goals, serves 
compelling State interests.”). 
 199.  Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666. 
 200.  Id. at 1667. 
 201.  Id. at 1667–68. 
 202.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 877–78, 884 (2009). 
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“[d]isproportionate spending to influence court judgments threatens 
both the appearance and actuality of judicial independence.”203 
Ultimately, the danger caused by judges’ direct solicitation 
closely mirrors the danger caused by donations that raised the 
specter of quid pro quo corruption. Indeed, as Justice Kennedy 
pointed out in McConnell, “[t]he quid pro quo nature of candidate 
contributions justified the conclusion that the contributions pose 
inherent corruption potential; and this in turn justified the 
conclusion that their regulation would stem the appearance of 
real corruption.”204 
In short, while the Supreme Court seems more broadly 
supportive of efforts to combat the appearance of partiality in the 
judicial context because of the distinctive role of judges,205 the 
Williams-Yulee decision should not be seen as a complete embrace of 
all efforts to root out the appearance of partiality in the judiciary. 
The narrowness of the decision also suggests that a policy such as the 
Scout ban, which is less closely rooted in efforts “to prevent a 
concrete as opposed to speculative harm,”206 would be treated less 
favorably by the Court.207 
 
 203.  Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1675 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg 
relied on studies that that “the money pressure groups spend on judicial elections ‘can affect 
judicial decision-making across a broad range of cases.’” Id. (quoting Brief of Professors of 
Law, Economics, and Political Science as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 14, 
Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (No. 13-1499)) (citing Joanna Shepherd & Michael S. Kang, 
SKEWED JUST. (2014), http://skewedjustice.org). 
 204.  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 298 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 205.  Joseph Grodin, Symposium: The Distinctive Character of Judging, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 30, 2015, 3:18 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/04/ 
symposium-the-distinctive-character-of-judging/. 
 206.  Brief for The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (No. 13-1499), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/Brief
sV4/13-1499_amicus_JeffersonCenter.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 207.  It is illustrative to contrast Chief Justice Roberts’s more restrained majority opinion 
with Justice Ginsburg’s broad concurrence. Justice Ginsburg wrote “separately to reiterate the 
substantial latitude, in my view, States should possess to enact campaign-finance rules geared to 
judicial elections.” Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Chief Justice 
Roberts, in contrast, emphasized that his opinion does not touch on “a slew of broader 
questions” such as whether judicial campaign spending can be capped. Id. at 1672 (majority 
opinion). Chief Justice Roberts thus makes it clear that his opinion applies only to the narrow 
set of circumstances implicated by direct judicial solicitation of funds. Id.; see also Jessica Ring 
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C. The Scout Ban Does Not Further a Compelling 
Governmental Interest 
While the Williams-Yulee opinion cautions against mechanically 
importing campaign finance logic into the judicial realm, the fact 
that California’s rationale falls so far outside of what the Court has 
accepted as a compelling interest suggests that, for this reason alone, 
the Scout ban should fail strict scrutiny. 
Just as only the appearance of quid pro quo corruption could 
justify restrictions on campaign finance donations, judicial codes of 
ethics should only be permitted to forbid a specific type of action in 
which an undue influence creates the perception that a judge is 
incapable of rendering an impartial or unbiased decision in a specific 
case. This was precisely the case with the direct solicitation in 
Williams-Yulee. In contrast, a general sense that a judge, through 
group membership, is more inclined towards a certain worldview 
should be deemed insufficient. As with membership in political 
parties and affiliation with political interest groups, judges are 
invariably influenced by ideology, association, and life experience. 
Attempting to isolate or prevent any sense of “shared interest” 
between members of the judiciary and the outside world would 
“dramatically expand government regulation” to 
impermissible levels.208 
As with elected officials, judges generally are given a wide degree 
of discretion and trust by society. As with those we elect, “public 
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime” of 
judicial discretion invariably creates some appearance of the potential 
for impropriety.209 Yet judges are presumed capable of putting aside 
individual feelings about certain issues in order to render an 
impartial and just verdict. Just as it may be unrealistic to expect the 
legislator always to legislate for the common good rather than for 
personal interests, so too might it be unrealistic to expect a judge 
always to be impartial despite personal feelings. But both of these 
expectations are essential for the functioning of a democratic society. 
 
Amunson, Symposium: A Rare Case Indeed, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 30, 2015, 11:15 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/04/symposium-a-rare-case-indeed/. 
 208.  McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1461 (2014). 
 209.  See id. at 1450 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976)). 
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Indeed, as the Supreme Court has noted, allowing judges to be 
opinionated about issues and to participate in their community is 
actually a boon and does not undermine trust in the judiciary. 
Because of the important role that judges play, it is “all the more 
imperative that they be allowed freely to express themselves on 
matters of current public importance.”210 Joining expressive 
associations such as the Boy Scouts is one way for a judge to express 
herself on a matter of great public importance. Membership in the 
Scouts also has other benefits such as community involvement and 
ensuring that judges interact with a variety of citizens.211 The Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct also seems to recognize that the general 
benefits of judicial involvement in the community substantially 
outweigh any partiality that a judge may acquire through “shared 
interest” with certain groups.212 
The fact that California seeks to restrict membership in only 
particular groups thus reveals that the State’s interest is not based on 
the existence of actual partiality or bias, which could constitute a 
compelling interest. Membership in permitted groups may just as 
strongly influence a judge’s worldview or ideology. For instance, a 
judge that is a member of a Humanist Society may feel strong 
antipathy toward religious plaintiffs. Likewise, a Jewish judge may 
feel great sympathy for a coreligionist plaintiff. On the other hand, 
members of groups are not monolithic and may disagree with certain 
policies and positions taken by that group while still remaining 
members. If a state truly has a compelling interest, it cannot be 
enforced haphazardly or selectively.213 As the Court emphasized in 
 
 210.  Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781 (2002) (quoting Wood v. 
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962)). 
 211.  See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations: Theoretically and 
Empirically Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 53 (2014) (arguing 
that freedom of association has independent value in enhancing “civic and political 
engagement,” and civic society). 
 212.  See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 3.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2007) (“Participation in both law-related and other extrajudicial activities helps integrate 
judges into their communities, and furthers public understanding of and respect for courts and 
the judicial system.”). As Professor Feldman has noted, “[a]nd how important is it, really, for 
judges to be treated as secular monks, cut off from certain disfavored forms of social contact to 
convince the public that they are pure and holy?” Feldman, supra note 5. 
 213.  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (noting that even 
categories of wholly unprotected speech cannot “be made the vehicles for content 
discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content”). 
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Williams-Yulee, “[u]nderinclusiveness can also reveal that a law does 
not actually advance a compelling interest.”214 By seeking to 
selectively enforce a group membership ban, the State thus admits 
that group membership is not sufficient to create actual partiality. 
Instead, the ban is motivated (at best) by the same illegitimate 
concern for the appearance of partiality or bias which the Court 
rejected in Citizen’s United and McCutcheon. 
Moreover, the State’s interest cannot be said to be compelling 
because it is based on pure conjecture that membership in the Scouts 
creates an appearance of partiality. There is no proof that the 
appearance of judicial partiality as a result of group membership is 
actually a problem of sufficient magnitude to justify the State’s 
restriction. As several judges on the San Diego Superior Court noted 
in their comment on the proposed change:  
Notably, the Committee does not cite a single survey, a single 
complaint about the impartiality of any judge, or even a bare 
anecdote in support of its “view” and “agreement.” It offers no 
empirical evidence of any kind, much less any substantial evidence 
that would justify the impact of the Proposal on the private lives 
of judges.215 
Absent any sort of finding that membership in groups such as the 
Boy Scouts actually raises concerns about the appearance of 
partiality, much less actual partiality, the radical step of banning 
membership cannot be justified. Even if the State’s interest is 
compelling in theory,216 it simply has not laid the factual foundation 
to justify burdening the rights of judges.217 
 
 214.  Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1668 (2015). 
 215.  AMENDMENT COMMENTARY, supra note 25, cmt. 516 at 231 (comment of Hon. 
Julia Kelety et al.). 
 216.  Under strict scrutiny, it is not enough for a governmental justification to be 
theoretically compelling at a high level of generality. Instead, a court must “carefully examine[] 
the interest asserted by the government.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
228 (1995). 
 217.  By contrast, as to non-expressive groups such as the Jaycees, the State might be able 
to argue under the Jaycees opinion that its interests trump because of the less substantial 
burden on freedom of association. Yet, even in the Jaycees case, the Court still applied strict 
scrutiny. See supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text. Moreover, it also seems that the 
State’s interest in combating discrimination is weaker when it only restricts judges from 
membership while allowing the group to continue to engage in what it considers invidious 
discrimination. Given that the State’s interest in reducing the appearance of generalized 
 
ORTNER.FINORTNER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016  10:50 AM 
1381 Scout’s Honor 
 1425 
Ultimately, the rationale underlying the Scout ban is more similar 
to that which the Court rejected in White than that which it 
embraced in Williams-Yulee. California has not suggested that 
judges’ mere membership in groups such as the Boy Scouts will 
impact their judicial decision-making and lead them to be biased 
towards or against particular litigants. The possibility of such an 
effect as this was central to the Court’s reasoning in Williams-Yulee. 
In contrast, just like the restriction on judicial speech that the Court 
rejected in White, the Scout ban seeks to curtail the appearance that 
judges have prejudged or decided issues before they reach the Court. 
Yet, while there is good reason to suspect that money will have a 
powerful and subversive impact on the administration of justice, 
California has not explained how mere membership in groups such 
as the Scouts will in any way bias the administration of justice. 
California’s interest is therefore not compelling. 
IV. EVEN IF THE STATE’S INTEREST IS COMPELLING, THE SCOUT 
BAN IS NOT NARROWLY TAILORED TO ACHIEVE THAT INTEREST 
The selective and haphazard nature of the ban also reveals how 
poorly fitted the law is to achieving the State’s purported interests. 
Thus, even if the ban could be justified as an effort to reduce the 
appearance of partiality, it should still be invalidated under the 
second prong of strict scrutiny analysis. This section will first look at 
the lack of narrow tailoring and then consider the abundance of less 
restrictive alternatives that the State could employ. 
A. The California Scout Ban Is Not Narrowly Tailored Because It Is 
Severely Under- and Overinclusive 
One of the major problems with the California policy is its gross 
underinclusiveness. While there is “no freestanding 
‘underinclusiveness limitation,’”218 as the Supreme Court explained 
in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, an ordinance that is underinclusive is 
especially problematic when it represents “a governmental attempt to 
give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in 
 
impropriety is not compelling, it seems hard to justify a restriction solely on 
judicial membership. 
 218.  Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668. (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387). 
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expressing its views to the people,” or involves the State seeking to 
“control . . . the search for political truth.”219 Moreover, as the Court 
explained in Ladue, the existence of a wide range of exemptions can 
“diminish the credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting 
speech in the first place.”220 With the California policy, the 
Government is banning membership in groups that are critical of 
homosexual conduct, while not restricting membership in advocacy 
groups that advocate for greater inclusion of sexual minorities. A 
judge could therefore be affiliated with the Gay and Lesbian Alliance 
Against Discrimination (GLAAD) or the Human Rights Campaign 
but not with the Boy Scouts of America.221 Thus, unlike the canon 
that the Court upheld in Williams-Yulee, the Scout ban does not 
apply “evenhandedly to all judges and judicial candidates, regardless 
of [their] viewpoint.”222 
Of course, it can be argued that the distinction is based not on 
the viewpoint of the group but on the choice to engage in what the 
State considers invidious discrimination. Yet this argument runs afoul 
of the Court’s reasoning in the Dale case: There are times when the 
act of discriminating in regard to membership is an essential part of 
the expressive message of a group.223 By limiting membership in 
groups that express views critical of homosexual conduct and that act 
upon that message by restricting membership, the State of California 
is giving “one side of a debatable public question an advantage in 
expressing its views to the people.” The policy also seeks to 
“control . . . the search for political truth” as it labels as unqualified 
those judges who wish to support the expressive message of 
the Scouts.224 
This viewpoint discrimination effectively undermines the State’s 
asserted interest even if that interest can be seen as compelling. If the 
State truly wanted to avoid all appearance of general partiality or 
bias, it would ban membership in all advocacy and expressive 
 
 219.  City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994) (citing Consolidated Edison Co. of 
New York v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980)). 
 220.  Id. at 52. 
 221.  Accord Grindlay, supra note 5, at 576 (“The Rule is also underinclusive in its 
one-sidedness.”). 
 222.  Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 1656 at 1668. 
 223.  See supra notes 54–62 and accompanying text. 
 224.  Ladue, 512 U.S. at 51. 
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groups—or at least those with a view about homosexual conduct.225 
After all, if mere membership in a group is sufficient to create a bias, 
then religious plaintiffs should be concerned if their judge is a 
member of a group often hostile to religion—such as a Humanist 
group or a gay rights group. Instead, the State is favoring 
membership of groups that advocate a certain viewpoint concerning 
the treatment of sexual minorities and disfavoring other viewpoints. 
The State’s concern for partiality is revealed as a façade because it is 
severely underinclusive. 
As Justice Scalia has noted, “[A] law cannot be regarded as 
protecting an interest of the highest order . . . when it leaves 
appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.”226 
By continuing to allow judges to participate in organizations that 
engage in issue advocacy, but not advocacy groups that have 
exclusive membership practices, the State still “leaves appreciable 
damage to [its] supposedly vital interest” in avoiding the appearance 
of bias “unprohibited.”227 For instance, a judge could openly be a 
member of a group that strongly advocates against gay rights while 
still remaining on the judiciary. Indeed, nothing would stop that 
judge from deciding a case that involves questions of gay rights, just 
as nothing prevented openly gay Judge Walker from reviewing 
California’s Proposition 8.228 Thus, absent evidence that membership 
in groups that have discriminatory membership practices is so much 
more harmful to the appearance of partiality, the rule should be 
invalidated for its extreme under-inclusion. 
 
 225.  Accord Grindlay, supra note 5, at 574 (“The Rule is also underinclusive with respect 
to that interest since the Rule goes only so far as to prohibit judges from belonging to 
organizations that practice ‘invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, gender, religion, 
national origin, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.’ It does not prohibit membership in groups 
that discriminate on other bases, such as disability, wealth, veteran status, ideology, 
intelligence, or physical attractiveness. If a judge’s membership in an exclusionary organization 
entails bias toward those excluded, then judges should also be prohibited from 
membership . . . .”) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). 
 226.  See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (Scalia J., concurring) 
(quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541–42 (1989)); see also Ladue, 512 U.S. at 52 
(stating that such under-inclusion can “diminish the credibility of the government’s rationale 
for restricting speech in the first place”). 
 227.  White, 536 U.S. at 780 (Scalia J., concurring). 
 228.  Jennifer Epstein, Gay-Marriage Foes: Judge was Biased, POLITICO (Apr. 26, 2011, 
6:52 AM EDT), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/53703.html. 
ORTNER.FINORTNER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016  10:50 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
1428 
The Scout ban is also severely overinclusive. Specifically, the ban 
imposes a broad stereotype on all members of a group simply based 
on group membership.229 But furthering the assumption that all 
members of the Boy Scouts are biased against sexual minorities “may 
come at the sacrifice of the long-term enhancement of the judicial 
system’s appearance of impartiality.”230 Many members of the Boy 
Scouts disagree with the current policies and procedures and seek to 
change them.231 Many others likely agree with the policies and yet 
would impartially decide a case brought by a member of the GLBTQ 
community and show great sympathy to such individuals. By 
stereotyping and prejudicing based on group membership, the 
California Supreme Court is sending the message that judges are 
simply creatures of bias who impose their personal views in the 
courtroom.232 By selectively imposing a ban on membership only in 
groups that are critical of homosexuals, the court is also leading to 
cynicism and a sense that the judicial system is biased in favor of 
certain interests. That, too, undermines the stated interest in the 
appearance of impartiality. 
B. The California Scout Ban Is Not Narrowly Tailored Because There 
Are Far Less Restrictive Alternatives 
Several less restrictive alternatives to the Scout ban also exist. For 
example, requiring judicial disclosure of group membership is clearly 
 
 229.  See Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance 
and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 627 (2004) (arguing that profiling 
individuals based on their belonging in a certain group is deeply problematic). 
 230.  Michelle L. Jones, Note, Religiously Devout Judges: A Decision-Making Framework 
for Judicial Disqualification, 88 IND. L.J. 1089, 1107 (2013). 
 231.  The Judicial Council for the Sixth Circuit grappled with this question when it 
considered whether a judge’s membership in a discriminatory golf club violated the Judicial 
Code of Ethics even though the judge had made efforts to get the club to change its 
membership practices. In a closely divided 10-8 decision, the Council concluded that the 
judge’s efforts “precluded a finding” that the canon was violated. See Phillips, supra note 15, 
at 734. 
 232.  See Grindlay, supra note 5, at 581 (“Public confidence in the judiciary certainly has 
suffered in recent years, but this is hardly due to judges’ membership in groups like the Boy 
Scouts. On the contrary, public confidence in the judiciary has decreased in large part because 
of the perception that judges have departed from their constitutionally prescribed role and 
have become beholden to certain ideologies.”). 
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permissible and less restrictive.233 In the case of In re Anastaplo, the 
Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the Illinois bar to deny 
admission to an individual who refused to answer questions 
regarding his Communist Party affiliation.234 The Court concluded 
that it is not “constitutionally impermissible” to ask those seeking 
admission to the bar questions about their group membership and 
affiliation.235 States are also free to adopt “recusal standards more 
rigorous than due process requires,” and to “censure judges who 
violate these standards.”236 
Professor Geyh draws a distinction between ethical and 
procedural restrictions that might also be helpful in considering less 
restrictive options: Procedural restrictions such as requiring recusal 
are seen as less burdensome than those that impose ethical 
obligations on judges.237 Indeed, the Supreme Court seems far more 
willing to allow for disqualification of judges in particular cases than 
punishment of judges attempting to exercise First Amendment 
rights.238 Judges can also be more fully circumscribed in their in-
court speech and perhaps greater limitations could be placed on the 
display of symbols of group membership, such as the Scout insignia, 
 
 233.  See id. at 574, 582; Andrew L. Kaufman, Judicial Correctness Meets Constitutional 
Correctness: Section 2C of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1293, 
1293 (2004). 
 234.  366 U.S. 82 (1961). 
 235.  Id. at 88. 
 236.  Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
While the Court in Williams-Yulee rejected recusal as a less restrictive alternative, it did so 
because of the immense burden that this would impose on the court system: “A rule requiring 
judges to recuse themselves from every case in which a lawyer or litigant made a campaign 
contribution would disable many jurisdictions.” See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 
1656, 1671 (2015). In contrast, there is no reason to think that asking judges to recuse 
themselves from cases when their membership in a group would create direct bias would 
unduly burden the judicial system. 
 237.  See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 
493, 528 (2013) (noting that “it may be problematic under the First Amendment to 
reprimand a judge for making statements to the detriment of her perceived impartiality, but 
not to disqualify her from a case for doing so”). 
 238.  See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (concluding 
that Due Process requires recusal in cases where “the probability of actual bias on the part of 
the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable” (quoting Withrow v. 
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975))); see also Keith Swisher, Recusal, Government Ethics, and 
Superannuated Constitutional Theory, 72 MD. L. REV. 219, 228 (2012); James Sample, 
Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 298 (2010). 
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that would make those standing before the judge feel as though the 
judge is biased against them.239 
Another significant concern with the Scout ban is that it 
unsettles judges’ expectations. When the State enacted the restriction 
on membership in groups that practice sexual orientation 
discrimination, it also enacted an exception for membership in youth 
groups such as the Boy Scouts. Many judges presumably joined the 
Boy Scouts and had their children participate under the expectation 
that the State “would not penalize them, directly or indirectly, for 
doing so thereafter.”240 At the very least, therefore, the State should 
not be able to retroactively impose punishment on judges that are 
already members of the Boy Scouts.241 A ban on new judges would 
still be unconstitutional, but the possibility of only a prospective ban 
shows that the existing law is far from the least restrictive alternative. 
Another alternative, as Feldman notes, is in the judicial selection 
process.242 In many states, voters directly elect judges and can choose 
those who do not belong to organizations such as the Boy Scouts. 
Likewise, as a result of social pressure, a President or Governor 
might become more reluctant to appoint judges that are active 
members of groups like the Scouts. Additionally, judges may 
voluntarily choose to limit or curtail involvement in groups such as 
the Scouts if in their judgment such an action is necessary to create 
greater community trust. 
Yet another possibility is that the determination of whether a 
group participates in invidious discrimination is left up to the 
individual judge and is not enforceable as a cause for removing a 
 
 239.  See Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 
687, 687 (1997). See generally Margaret Tarkington, Attorney Speech and the Right to an 
Impartial Adjudicator, 30 REV. LITIG. 849, 864 (2011) (discussing limitations on attorney 
speech in a court room setting). 
 240.  Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 268 (1957). 
 241.  While it of course is possible for a judge to cease membership in order to escape 
punishment, forcing a judge to decide between exercising his religious, expressive, and parental 
rights, or losing his livelihood is especially problematic. 
 242.  Feldman, supra note 5 (“Then we wouldn’t be able to rely on the canons of judicial 
conduct to create the appearance of fairness. We would have to rely instead on vigilance and 
common sense, and choose judges who are actually fair and actually don’t discriminate. Which 
doesn’t sound so bad after all.”). 
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judge from service.243 For instance, the commentary to the Arkansas 
Judicial code states that “[u]ltimately, each judge must determine in 
the judge’s own conscience whether participation in such an 
organization violates [the rule].”244 This approach would encourage 
judges to self-regulate and avoid membership in organizations that 
would send the wrong message to litigants without infringing on 
constitutionally protected rights.245 
Alternatively, the State could enforce the ban on membership in 
groups that engage in invidious discrimination only in cases where 
the facts “clearly and convincingly lead to the conclusion that the 
words and actions call into question the integrity and impartiality of 
the judge.”246 The Washington Supreme Court for instance 
overturned sanctions against a judge who attended and spoke at an 
anti-abortion rally.247 The Court concluded that “the strict scrutiny 
required” could only be satisfied with specific evidence that would 
justify construing the remarks “as an express or implied promise to 
decide particular issues in a particular way.”248 Under the standard 
employed by the Washington Supreme Court, only a situation where 
membership in a group created “an express or implied promise to 
decide particular issues in a particular way” could justify excluding 
one from sitting on the bench, rather than simply general group 
 
 243.  The Oral Advice summary of November 2015 seems to hint at this approach 
without fully embracing it. It suggests that judges are ultimately responsible for determining 
whether a group practices invidious discrimination. Yet, it also does not foreclose the 
possibility of challenges and enforcement of the ban. Calif. Supreme Court Comm. on Judicial 
Ethics Ops., Oral Advice Summary No. 2015-014 (Nov. 12, 2015), 
http://www.judicialethicsopinions.ca.gov/sites/default/files/CJEO%20Oral%20Advice%20Su
mmary%202015-014.pdf. 
 244.  ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 r. 3.6 AFFILIATION WITH 
DISCRIMINATORY ORGANIZATIONS cmt. [2A] (2014), https://courts.arkansas.gov/rules-and-
administrative-orders/court-rules/rule-36-affiliation-discriminatory-organizations. 
 245.  By inviting comments specifically on a ban of membership in the Boy Scouts of 
America, California took a stance and asserted that the Boy Scouts engaged in invidious 
discrimination. Thus, were California to adopt the Arkansas approach it would probably need 
to clarify that it is not taking a stance on whether or not the Boy Scouts engages in 
invidious discrimination. 
 246.  In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanders, 955 P.2d 369, 377 (Wash. 1998). 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Id. at 376. 
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membership.249 Such a ban on group membership would likely 
survive strict scrutiny because it deals with actual and specific 
partiality rather than merely the appearance of partiality that results 
from group membership.250 If California wants to keep and actively 
enforce a ban on group membership, this seems like the least 
restrictive and most likely constitutional alternative. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In his dissent in In re Anastaplo, Justice Black powerfully spoke 
of a tendency in the bar which also appears to underlie California’s 
attempt to bar its judges from membership in the Boy Scouts: 
To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-
serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade 
it. . . . Too many men are being driven to become government-
fearing and time-serving because the Government is being 
permitted to strike out at those who are fearless enough to think as 
they please and say what they think. This trend must be halted if 
we are to keep faith with the Founders of our Nation and pass on 
to future generations of Americans the great heritage of 
freedom which they sacrificed so much to leave to us.251 
California’s decision is unfortunately yet another step towards 
forcing out of public service individuals who disagree with the 
consensus position on controversial social issues. Once, communist 
membership was a badge of shame that barred membership from the 
bar and other professions. Today in California, membership in an 
organization that has produced at least four Presidents of the United 
States252 and a variety of other national leaders has become a new 
 
 249.  Id. For instance, one could imagine that group which engages in invidious 
discrimination and also has an oath of membership could be seen as binding on the judge to 
decide a case in a certain way. 
 250.  The Sixth Circuit Judicial Conference has likewise suggested that the code of 
judicial ethics can best be seen as “general guidance” and must be applied on a case-by-case 
basis. See Phillips, supra note 15, at 743. 
 251.  366 U.S. 82, 115–16 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 252.  President Barack Hussein Obama was a member of Gerakan Pramuka; an 
Indonesian Scout Association roughly the equivalent of the Boy Scouts. If counted, he would 
be the fifth President to be a Scout. Jimmy Carter was also a Scoutmaster as an adult. See 100 
Things You Didn’t Know About Scouting, BOY SCOUTS AM.: NAT’L SCOUT JAMBOREE, 
http://www.scouting.org/JamboreeMedia/100Things.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2015). 
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sign of stigma and exclusion. As Justice Black urged, in order to 
secure this nation’s “great heritage of freedom” and “keep faith with 
the Founders of our Nation,” this trend towards exclusion and 
ostracism “must be halted.”253 
California’s ban is inconsistent with that “great heritage of 
freedom” because it stigmatizes, stereotypes, ostracizes and excludes 
people from judicial service in violation of deeply held fundamental 
rights of association, parental autonomy, and free exercise of religion. 
California’s Scout ban—and similar bans that are likely to crop up in 
other states—cannot be justified by a compelling interest and is 
poorly tailored to achieve the State’s purpose. It should 
be overturned. 
 
Daniel Ortner* 
  
 
 253.  Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 116 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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